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I. INTRODUCTION
AMERICA WITNESSED such an explosion in litigation con-
I erning aviation matters that the courts have heard and de-
cided more aviation cases within the last decade than at any
other time during the history of the Nation. Many courts grap-
pled with issues surrounding the express preemption provision
within one of the congressional aviation acts. The cursory na-
ture with which opposing sides have presented such cases has
led to conflicting results and a confused state of aviation legal
policy. The vehemence with which parties have argued, how-
ever, serves notice of the underlying rivalry for the, as yet, un-
resolved control of the aviation subject.
What place does the unfettered aviation subject serve, if any,
within the confines of the American federalist system? Want, or
fear, of an answer prompts fierce debates about the scope of
preemption, for preemption historically represents one of the
doctrinal means by which the American judiciary balances and
maintains the powers within the system, and therefore creates
authority for, and over, each subject part of the Nation.
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II. ORIGINATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
A. PRIOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The drafters of the Constitution of the United States of
America envisioned a system of institutions capable of governing
vast amounts of diverse entities, individuals, territories, and con-
cepts. Just as important, the drafters intended to restrain these
same institutions from dominating or suppressing the actions,
innovations, and growth of those chosen to be governed by this
system. From these premises the drafters wrote a constitution
which created a new and unique federalist system.
Black's Law Dictionary defines the United States federal govern-
ment as that "system of government administered in a nation
formed by the union or confederation of several independent
states."'
In afederalgovernment, on the other hand, [in contrast to the inef-
fectual Confederation] the allied states form a union-not ... to
destroy their separate organization . . . but so that the central
power is erected into a true national government, possessing sov-
ereignty . . . while the administration of national affairs is di-
rected, and its effects felt, not by the separate states deliberating
as units, but by the people of all, in their collective capacity, as
citizens of the nation.2
The drafters of the Constitution sought to incorporate all of
the separate and independent parts necessary to form a nation
into a whole system greater than the sum of its individual parts.'
This whole system consisted of a Union powerful enough to
both effectively govern and simultaneously protect the interests
of all of its parts (federal entities, states, individuals, business
entities, and other groups) without destroying the individuality
of each part. The continuity and effectiveness of such a system
depended on mechanisms built into it which were capable of
balancing the powers of each entity so that no one governmen-
tal institution interfered with the sphere of power of the others.4
From its inception, the United States Supreme Court desig-
nated itself as the fulcrum of this crucial balancing act.5 The
I BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 611 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
2 Id.
s See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); M'Culloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
4 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
SM'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400-01.
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Supreme Court decided early on that the federal and state gov-
ernments represented two of the most necessary and independ-
ent spheres of power in the system. Thus, the Supreme Court
immediately began to balance those institutions' respective pow-
ers in the interests of the Union and its various entities.6
To accomplish some of these acts, the Supreme Court devel-
oped what became known as the preemption doctrine. With the
use of this doctrine to decide the outcome of case issues, the
Supreme Court substantiated the power and authority of the
whole Union in relation to the states' rights. However, the
Court's decisions also assured the federal and state institutions
of their respective and separate spheres of power within the en-
tirety of the system and delineated the scope thereof.
What was the purpose and appropriate use of the preemption
doctrine? Shortly after its inception, other entities, principally
the states, challenged the very existence of the Union as a sepa-
rate entity with supreme authority within its own sphere. At
least in the early half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court used its constitutional power to clearly establish the valid-
ity of a Union and the supremacy of its federal laws and
regulations.7
[TIhese States .... [have] said, that they were sovereign ....
But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a
government.., the whole character in which the States appear,
underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by
a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was
effected.
We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers,
other than is given by the language of the instrument which con-
fers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they
were conferred.8
The Union was made by the people and bound the states:
"But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually
granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to
arise, as long as our system shall exist."9 The powers of the fed-
eral government must be determined from the nature of the pur-
pose of the entire Constitution. "The nullity of any act,
6 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
7 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
8 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187, 189.
9 M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
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inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the declaration
that the constitution is the supreme law."1 As ChiefJustice Mar-
shall warned, "[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding."1'
In the Union's infancy, the Supreme Court intended to
clearly establish that the federal and state governments occu-
pied two separate spheres of power. Should the states' use or
effect of its power conflict with, or create an incompatibility
with, the nature and purpose of enumerated federal powers at
any time, the federal law voided the states' use of its powers.
Thus, early Supreme Court decisions established the supremacy
of the Union created by the Constitution.
1 2
Supreme Court decisions acknowledged the states as institu-
tions with a separate sphere of power. The states were entitled
to regulate the entities within their sovereignty except upon sub-
jects covered by the enumerated powers of the federal govern-
ment. Chief Justice Marshall allowed that the states could
regulate some of the same subjects as the federal government.
Nevertheless, the states did not share powers concurrently with
the federal government. Insofar as the federal government
maintained and exercised its valid authority, if, and when, a
state regulation came into conflict with those of its federal coun-
terpart, the federal laws and regulations took precedence. So
did the Union itself take precedence within the concept of the
greater whole acting for the good of all of its parts. 13
The breadth of the preemptive power presented as many ini-
tial controversies as the question of the Union's validity and
supremacy. Initially, the Supreme Court clearly intended that
federal law preempted a state regulation in any form which
threatened the supremacy of the Union or touched the Nation's
interests. 14
The Supreme Court determined the scope of federal preemp-
tion, and thereby the breadth of federal power, by the meaning
of the words of the laws or issues in controversy. 5 ChiefJustice
Marshall repeatedly emphasized that the meaning of words must
be used "in that sense which common usage justifies."' 6 The
10 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210-11 (emphasis added).
11 M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (emphasis added).
12 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
13 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
14 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
15 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
16 M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414.
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words must also be used with the connotation of construing the
meaning and purpose of the entire Constitution. 17
If, in the Court's reading, any subject of state regulation
would require national uniformity, it would fall under the
supremacy of the federal government. That supremacy re-
moved any regulation repugnant thereto. So long as this coun-
try needed to validate its very existence, the Supreme Court
consistently used the doctrine of preemption to guarantee the
federal government's expansive powers over a wide range of
subjects, and particularly over those which exhibited interstate
characteristics."8
As the existence and stability of the Union became an ac-
cepted reality the need to restrain, rather than protect, its
growth and power became an object of concern for many parts
of the system. The desire for individual autonomy blurred the
lines between the powers necessary to maintain uniformity of
subjects among the various parts of the federalist system. By the
mid-nineteenth century, Supreme Court decisions reflected the
Justices' internal dissensions, and thereafter consistent
problems with defining the breadth of preemption. This dissen-
sion also generated a panoply of words in an attempt to more
precisely define and limit the scope of federal power.
Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, con-
taining not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite un-
like in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single
uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United
States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question,
as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet
the local necessities of navigation.
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of this
power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight
of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert concern-
ing all of them, what is really applicable but to a part."
Plumley v. Massachusetts,2" decided in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, glaringly indicated the Supreme Court's
growing struggle to construct rules by which courts could deter-
mine the breadth of preemption, and thus, indirectly, define
the power of the federal government over all of the entities
within the governmental system.
17 Id. at 415-21.
18 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
19 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
20 155 U.S. 461 (1894).
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The majority decided:
We are not unmindful of the fact-indeed, this court has often
had occasion to observe-that the acknowledged power of the
States to protect the morals, the health, and safety of their peo-
ple by appropriate legislation, sometimes touches, in its exercise,
the line separating the respective domains of national and state
authority. But in view of the complex system of government
which exists in this country .... "the rare and difficult scheme of
one general government, whose action extends over the whole,
but which possesses only certain enumerated powers, and of nu-
merous state governments, which retain and exercise all powers
not delegated to the Union," the judiciary of the United States
should not strike down a legislative enactment of a State-espe-
cially if it has direct connection with the social order, the health,
and the morals of its people-unless such legislation plainly and
palpably violates some right granted or secured by the national
Constitution or encroaches upon the authority delegated to the
United States for the attainment of objects of national concern. 2'
Dissenting, Justice Fuller argued:
The power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among
the several states is the power to prescribe the rule by which that
commerce is to be governed, and, as that commerce is national
in its character and must be governed by a uniform system, so
long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing
the States to do so, it thereby indicates its will that such com-
merce shall be free and untrarnmelled. Manifestly, whenever
state legislation comes in conflict with that will, it must give way.
In whatever language such legislation may be framed, its pur-
pose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect,
and the presumption that it was enacted in good faith cannot
control the determination of the question whether it is or is not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. ...
I deny that a state may exclude from commerce legitimate sub-
jects of commercial dealings because of the possibility that their
appearance may deceive purchasers in regard to their qualities.22
As indicated by Plumley, by the end of the nineteenth century,
Supreme Court decisions had failed to resolve the issues con-
cerning the nature and scope of the federal government's pre-
emptive powers. The Court continually attempted to shape,
reshape, and simultaneously preserve, according to the Consti-
21 Plumley, 155 U.S. at 479-80.
22 Id. at 480-81.
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tution, the separate federal and state spheres of power as the
Nation and subjects changed with time. Yet, the Court's con-
duct reflected the original drafters' intent that it should con-
stantly balance federal and state powers to protect the interests
of all of the parts of the federalist system.
B. THE FRRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
In the first half of the twentieth century the nation exper-
ienced a technological and industrial revolution. During this
time, Congress passed massive amounts of legislation and based
some of it on the federal government's expansive constitutional
powers to control interstate commerce. Congress intended its
actions to protect the new and fledgling industries and busi-
nesses of the twentieth century. Yet, the passage of such legisla-
tion dramatically increased the powers of Congress.23
The Supreme Court frequently used the preemption doctrine
to maintain the balance and parameters between the various
parts of the federalist system in this rapidly changing national
scenario. The Court addressed many and varied controversies
concerning the breadth of that power. However, initially, so
long as the Court conceptionalized the facts and issues in a case
to touch the subject of interstate commerce, the Court granted
the federal government exclusive power.24 "The power of Con-
gress over interstate commerce 'is complete in itself, may be ex-
ercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the Constitution.' That power can
neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exer-
cise of state power. ' 25 More accurately: "[T]he question is
whether the state interest is outweighed by a national interest in
the unhampered operation of interstate commerce. "26
Also:
Congress of course could have "circumscribed its regulations" so
as to occupy a limited field. But so far as it did legislate, the
exclusive effect ... did not relate merely to details of the statute
and the penalties it imposed, but extended to the whole subject
.... The States thereafter could not legislate so as to require
23 See H. BROGAN, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(1990).
24 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-84 (1945); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941); Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S.
439, 446-47 (1915); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 (1913).
25 Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (citation omitted).
26 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
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greater or less or different equipment; nor could they punish by
imposing greater or less or different penalties. . . "In such a
case, the legislation of Congress, in what it does prescribe, mani-
festly indicates that it does not intend that there shall be any far-
ther [sic] legislation to act upon the subject-matter .... IT]he
will of Congress upon the whole subject is as clearly established by
what it had not declared, as by what it has expressed."27
The Court even voided safety measures taken by states which
regulated the structure, design, equipment, or procedure of any
interstate railway operation because Congress expressed the
need for economic efficiency and uniform rules throughout
that business to guarantee its permanency. 28
The Court had clearly established in its earliest decisions the
Union's exclusive power over the entire subject of interstate
commerce. 29 In the early half of the twentieth century, Con-
gress, with the support of the Supreme Court, used that power
to protect other entities at the expense of the individual state. °
Such conduct constituted a subtle, radical new shift in the bal-
ance of essential power elements. Concern over this trend
caused Justice Stone, in a strongly worded dissent in Hines v.
Davidowitz to admonish the Court: "At a time when the exercise
of the federal power is being rapidly expanded through Congres-
sional action, it is difficult to overstate the importance of safe-
guarding against such diminution of state power .... "'I
Originally, the Supreme Court used the preemption doctrine
to establish the supremacy of the Union based on the Constitu-
tion. With the massive twentieth century changes, the Court
found it increasingly necessary to determine the scope of the
supremacy of only one part of the Union's federal government,
the Congress. Additionally, the Court, more often than not,
based such interpretations on legislative, rather than constitu-
tional, wording.
No longer was the Court "simply" expounding a constitution.
Gone were the days when the Court acted as the voice of the
Constitution to arbitrate between competing federal and state
27 Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. at 446-47 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
218 Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 781-84.
2 See Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 761; Darby, 312 U.S. at 100; Southern Ry. Co.,
236 U.S. at 439; McDermott, 228 U.S. at 115; Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1;
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
30 Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 761; Darby, 312 U.S. at 100; Southern Ry. Co., 236
U.S. at 439; McDermott, 228 U.S. at 115.
31 312 U.S. 52, 75 (1941) (emphasis added).
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powers to preserve the Union. Increasingly, the changes caused
by the new and burgeoning twentieth century businesses and
technological entities forced the Court to interpret a morass of
often poorly worded congressional legislation to balance various
powers, including these new businesses, in a conceptually differ-
ent and changing nation.
Subtly, the Court established the precedent which everyone
thereafter conclusively accepted-that the validity of a state stat-
ute under the Supremacy Clause depended on the intent of
Congress rather than the purpose of the Constitution. Such an
interpretation has impaired the Court's use of the preemption
doctrine in the twentieth century.
The shift in emphasis to congressional power within the fed-
eral sphere forced the Supreme Court to add another panoply
of words to reshape, redefine, and further delineate the limits of
the preemption doctrine. The Court remained always conscious
of the need to assuage the states' concern over the expanding
powers of the several branches of the federal government and
expressly so stipulated in most cases. Nevertheless, during this
era, the Court generally used the preemption doctrine to sup-
port Congress's expanding power.
In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., Justice Douglas stated that
congressional statutes could not preempt laws over subjects cov-
ered by the states' historic police powers unless Congress made
its intentions to so do "clear and manifest."32 Congress made its
intent clear and manifest only when the state statutes irreconcil-
ably conflicted with federal objectives; supplemented a federally
pervaded subject; regulated the same federally dominated sub-
ject; or imposed the same obligations as federal law on the
subject.33
Despite the assumption that the state might continue to regu-
late all of the subjects concerning the safety and welfare of its
citizens within state borders regardless of congressional legisla-
tion on the matters, in this case, the Court concluded:
[The issue] is whether the matter on which the State asserts the
right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act. If it is, the
federal scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less pervasive
regulatory plan than that of the State .... The provisions of Illi-
32 331 U.S. 218, 230, rev'd, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
3s Id. at 230.
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nois law on those subjects must therefore give way by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause.34
In another case decided the same year, and with similar ex-
postulations and results, Justice Frankfurter divulged the
Court's modus operandi during this climate of shifting powers:
A shrewd critic has thus expressed the considerations that in the
past have often lain below the surface of merely doctrinal appli-
cations: "Formally the enterprise is one of interpretation of the
Act of Congress to discover its scope. Actually it is often the en-
terprise of reaching a judgment whether the situation is so ade-
quately handled by national prescription that the impediment of
further state requirements is to be deemed a bane rather than a
blessing."35
During this era, the Supreme Court continuously, case by
case, reshaped and redefined the boundaries of the preemption
doctrine to preserve the Union, the federalist system, and itself
within a changing system. However, the other federal and state
courts often found themselves unable to apply such an esoteric
and shifting doctrine with any degree of certainty to the specific
cases before their courts. Some of the lower courts thus used
the preemption doctrine with such unexplained inconsistency
as to wreak havoc on the very institutions the Court sought to
preserve.
C. THE USE OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE IN AvIATION
MATT-ERS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
Through the clouds, into the clear blue sky, onto the power
scene of the twentieth century's expanding technology, and
therefore, inevitably onto the Supreme Court's lap, burst air-
planes and the aviation industry. Would it be a blessing or a
bane?
The actuality of the concept of aviation burst upon a twenti-
eth century world which had never anticipated such a reality
within its power structures. The world witnessed the awesome
and boundless capabilities of this industry during both World
Wars. No sovereign power intended to obstruct the growth of,
34 Id. at 236.
35 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
783 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., writing in a separate opinion in which Justices Mur-
phy and Rutledge joined) (citing Thomas R. Powell, Current Conflicts Between the
Commerce Clause and State Police Power, 12 MINN. L. REv. 607, 607 (1928)).
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or relinquish control of, such an entity which might even
threaten nations' very existences. 6
From the infancy of the aviation industry, the federal govern-
ment of the United States left little doubt that the Nation in-
tended, especially through the sphere of broad and
comprehensive congressional legislation, to control all of the
power of the aviation industry. Yet, the means by which the Na-
tion could control an unknown and unprecedented entity posed
dilemmas for governments.
On one hand, the federal government intended to establish
its preeminence in regulation over the entire aviation field, to
encourage and protect the rapid growth of that industry, and
thereby solidify its own power in international matters and
within the federalist system. On the other hand, the expansion
of federal power and precedents to control an essentially uncon-
trollable and boundless entity threatened the balance of sover-
eigns' powers within the federalist system, and perhaps the very
existence of the concept of federalism.37
Congressional passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
(CAA), and the subsequent Supreme Court decisions, clearly es-
tablished that aircrafts would have unchallenged authority to
the clear blue skies.3 8 The Court, in United States v. Causby,
quickly made precedential law to such effect:
The air is a public highway .... To recognize ... private claims
to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere
with their control and development in the public interest, and
transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has
a just claim.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the
land, is part of the public domain .... Flights over private land
are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a
36 Frederick A. Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARv. L. REV. 1235,
1252 (1947). "It was by 1938 generally agreed that federal legislation to the ut-
most limits of the Constitution was desirable; that it should be based upon the
commerce clause; that it should cover both commercial and private flying; and
that it should include both economic and safety regulation." Id.
37 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258-68 (1946); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294-301 (1944).
38 See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-681 (West 1940) (re-
pealed 1958) [hereinafter CAA]. The federal government's complete control
over civil aviation preempted any other regulations' applicability to such issues.
Id.
1996]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of
the land. 9
Justice Black dissented in Causby because he thought that the
Constitution entrusted Congress with full control of navigable
airspace and not just that space above the regulated minimum
safe altitude. Thus, no flight constituted a compensable tak-
ing.4" Justice Black warned the Court against introducing any
old concepts of private ownership of land into the field of air
regulation, and thus, interfering with Congress's powers to de-
velop the necessary new and vital solutions to the original
problems which must arise in the aviation industry.4
Indeed, for a Justice on the Supreme Court of the United
States of America to articulate the position that a mere business,
the aviation industry, constituted such a vital component in the
Nation's security system, and to the existence of the federalist
system, that its preservation and control by the federal govern-
ment justified eliminating the precedential concepts of land
ownership (a foundational concept of the Constitution and
most other governments) in pursuit thereof, represented a most
surprising development in Constitutional law.
Yet, shortly after Causby, the majority of Justices, in Chicago &
Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,42 stated:
However useful parallels with older forms of transit may be in
adjudicating private rights, we see no reason why the efforts of
the Congress to foster and regulate development of a revolution-
ary commerce that operates in three dimensions should be judi-
cially circumscribed with analogies taken over from two-
dimensional transit.43
Indeed, based on the original CAA and subsequent similar
regulations, the Supreme Court established unassailable prece-
dents which gave Congress exclusive jurisdiction over air flight,
and over any incident applicable to air flight. Such all encom-
passing precedents seemed to have completely resolved any is-
sues of control over the new technology. But such a radical shift
39 Causby, 328 U.S. at 261, 266. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 401-682 (West 1940) (repealed 1958) ("There is hereby recognized and de-
clared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a public right of free-
dom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of the United
States.").
40 Causby, 328 U.S. at 271.
41 Id. at 274-75.
42 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
43 Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
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in the balance of powers in a system predicated on balance cre-
ated problems.
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, many of the Justices elo-
quently expressed their concerns about the unknown and possi-
bly uncontrollable evolutionary aspects of such a powerful
technology as aviation. 4 The Justices worried about the capabil-
ity, or lack thereof, of possibly outdated systems to assimilate rev-
olutionary concepts, and about the Court's ability, or lack
thereof, to resolve the inevitable conflicts connected to them.45
Faced with controversies about the economic or spatial
growth of the aviation industry in its infancy, the federal govern-
ment provided "blanket" protection for the entity, and asserted
dominant power over it. When faced with the reality that this
industry could threaten its sovereignty, however, the federal gov-
ernment made significant choices to balance the power between
sovereigns which affected the aviation industry and the Union
forever.
In Northwest Airlines, the Supreme Court addressed one of the
many controversies surrounding what, how, and when entities
could tax a subject which constantly moved through the air.46
Originally, the Supreme Court definitively granted exclusive
control to Congress over the Nation's airspace and all aircraft
flying through it. The Court thereby indirectly protected avia-
tor's rights to operate according to congressional statute at the
expense of others.4 7
The Court reexamined its expansive position when con-
fronted with an issue of the respective sovereigns' rights to tax
the aviation industry. In Northwest Airlines, the State of Minne-
sota asserted its right to tax all of the personal property of
Northwest Airlines.4 The airline company objected to being
taxed on several legal grounds, including its right to protection
under the Commerce Clause.49
Since the origination of the Nation, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that a sovereign's power to tax, and thereby acquire rev-
enue, constituted one necessary element of any sovereign's
existence. 0 The Supreme Court realized that failure to validate
44 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
45 Id. at 300.
46 Id. at 292.
47 Causby, 328 U.S. at 256.
48 Northwest Airlines, 322 U.S. at 292-94.
49 Id.
50 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
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Congress's power to tax the aviation industry threatened federal
sovereignty at the expense of one business entity within the sys-
tem. Also, failure to readjust the balance of sovereign powers
within the system, in relation to this new industry, threatened
the sovereignty of all spheres.
Thus, the Court concluded that the State of Minnesota could
tax all of the personal property of Northwest Airlines, even that
which flew elsewhere, because the airline company's principal
place of corporate business resided in Minnesota."1
The continuous protection by a State other than the domiciliary
State-that is, protection throughout the tax year-has fur-
nished the constitutional basis for tax apportionment in these
interstate commerce situations, and it is on that basis that the tax
laws have been framed and administered.
Although a part of the taxing systems of this country, the rule
of apportionment is beset with friction, waste and difficulties, but
at all events it grew out of, and has established itself in regard to,
land commerce. To what extent it should be carried over to the
totally new problems presented by the very different modes of
transportation and communication that the airplane and the ra-
dio have already introduced, let alone the still more subtle and
complicated technological facilities that are on the horizon,
raises questions that we ought not to anticipate; certainly we
ought not to embarrass the future by judicial answers which at
best can deal only in a truncated way with problems sufficiently
difficult even for legislative statesmanship....
But not to subject property that has no locality other than the
State of its owner's domicile to taxation there would free such
floating property from taxation everywhere. And... neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment affords such
constitutional immunity.
Each new means of interstate transportation and communica-
tion has engendered controversy regarding the taxing powers of
the States inter se and as between the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment. Such controversies and some conflict and confusion
are inevitable under a federal system. They have long been the
source of difficulty and dissatisfaction for us.5 2
Powers under the Commerce Clause had never entirely taken
precedence over constitutional authority for sovereign rights of
taxation. 5 The Court refused to establish any such new prece-
51 Northwest Airlines, 322 U.S. at 299.
52 Id. at 297, 300-01 (citations omitted).
53 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
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dents to protect the aviation industry. These cases caused the
drawing of lines. Thereafter, the Court no longer used its pre-
emptive powers to completely shield the aviation industry from
the control of other entities in the system.
However, various Justices' statements in Northwest Airlines pro-
vided a further hint of the anticipated struggles by various enti-
ties to reconcile the sovereigns' control over this new and
unique aviation technology. According to Justice Jackson's con-
curring opinion:
Students of our legal evolution know how this Court inter-
preted the commerce clause of the Constitution to lift navigable
waters of the United States out of local controls and into the do-
main of federal control. Air as an element in which to navigate is
even more inevitably federalized by the commerce clause than is
navigable water. Local exactions and barriers to free transit in
the air would neutralize its indifference to space and its conquest of
time.
Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regu-
lating air commerce. Federal control is intensive and exclusive.
Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They
move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in
the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate
system of federal commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a
runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of con-
trols. It takes off only by instruction from the control tower, it
travels on prescribed beams, it may be diverted from its intended
landing, and it obeys signals and orders. Its privileges, rights,
and protection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the Fed-
eral Government alone and not to any state government.
Congress has not extended its protection and control to the field of tax-
ation, although I take it no one denies that constitutionally it may
do so.... Our function is to determine what rule governs in the
absence of such legislative enactment.54
The Court established that neither the states nor any individuals
possessed sovereignty over the airspace. The Court denied the
states any rights to tax aircraft in flight. However, the Court re-
fused to completely resolve the controversy over the states' sov-
ereignty to tax aviation matters until Congress legislated on the
matter.55 Justice Black noted, "I do not think we can derive
from decisional law a satisfactory adjustment of the conflicting
M Northwest Airlines, 322 U.S. at 303-04 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 301; see id. at 301-02 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 302-08 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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needs of the nation for free air commerce and the natural de-
sire of localities to have revenue from the business that goes on
about them. 5 6
While struggling to resolve the novel problems caused by the
ascension of aviation technology upon the national scene, the
courts failed to grasp the significance of the fact that, by the
twentieth century, the courts' conclusions depended on their in-
terpretations of Congressional intent, rather than the Nation's
or entities' needs.
At the inception of the Union, the courts interpreted consti-
tutional purposes and used preemptive powers to establish uni-
form and consistent bodies of law on certain subjects such as
ships sailing through the seas.57 By the mid-twentieth century,
and at the time of the advent of aircraft sailing through the air,
the courts instead interpreted Congress's intent to provide uni-
form regulation over certain subjects. 58 The courts seem not to
have recognized this subtle shift in the way courts now balanced
power and used preemption.
Yet, to attempt to enact uniform and comprehensive law over
such a vast field as aviation by interpretation of congressional
legislation, rather than constitutional purpose, regardless of the
language applied, inevitably led to piecemeal, flawed, and un-
certain divisions of power over the entity. This ad hoc approach
has been to the detriment of the aviation industry, as demon-
strated by some of the related twentieth century decisions.
III. THE APPLICATION OF AN EVOLVING PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE TO LITIGATION SURROUNDING AIR
COMMERCE IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DEVELOPED A
GENERAL RULE FOR THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE BASED
ON CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In the mid-twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court posited a general rule for the use of preemption:
The test of whether both federal and state regulations may oper-
ate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both regula-
tions can be enforced without impairing the federal
56 Id. at 307 (Jackson, J., concurring).
57 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1.
58 See generally Rice, 331 U.S. at 218, 230; Bethlehem Steel Co., 330 U.S. at 767;
Causby, 328 U.S. at 256; Northwest Airlines, 322 U.S. at 292.
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superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at simi-
lar or different objectives....
The maturity of avocados seems to be an inherently unlikely
candidate for exclusive federal regulation.59
A legislative history replete with words concerning uniformity
would manifest Congress's intent to preempt state law on a sub-
ject. Such legislative history did not exist in this case in contrast
to findings in others.60
The Court found that it could validly justify and balance the
supremacy of federal power over a subject matter by weighing
the Nation's need for uniform control in order to protect all of
the national interests, and indirectly, all of the other entities
thereunder. Balancing uniformity versus individuality thus be-
came one of the determining factors in the use of preemption.6'
The only problem remaining was the Court's practice, during
this era, of reaching a determination about uniformity based on
the Court's interpretation of congressional definition and intent
on the subject.
B. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S USE OF PREEMPTION
UNDER BOTH AVIATION ACTS FROM 1950 TO 1978
As oft times explicitly worded, Congress intended to control
the field of aviation because of aviation's importance to the mili-
tary and economic security of the Nation.62 "Air transportation
5q Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
(emphasis added).
60 Id. at 147-48 (citing Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) as the basis for
the Court's conclusive contrast).
61 See Zook, 336 U.S. at 728; Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst,
132 F. Supp. 871, 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
62 Indeed, Congress enacted more comprehensive regulations in the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1307-1542 (West 1973) (repealed 1994)
[hereinafter FAA or Federal Aviation Act of 1958], which superseded the CAA,
for the express purpose of creating
[A] Federal Aviation Agency, to provide for the regulation and pro-
motion of civil aviation in such manner as to best foster its develop-
ment and safety, and to provide for the safe and efficient use of the
airspace by both civil and military aircraft, and for other purposes.
In exercising the authority granted in, and discharging the duties
imposed by, this Act, the Administrator gave full consideration to
the requirements of national defense, and of commercial and gen-
eral aviation, and to the public right of freedom of transit through
the navigable airspace.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, H.R. REp. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 20th Sess. (1958),
reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3741.
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has come to play an increasingly important role in the economy
of the Nation and constitutes a vital element in national de-
fense. ' 63 Supreme Court decisions reflected congressional per-
ceptions: "A major impetus to federal regulations of air
transportation was the failure of the preceding era of freely
competitive price and route warfare to bring stability to the Na-
tion's air transport industry. "64
With each decision connecting uniformity to aviation matters,
the Court more clearly established an exclusive federal control
over any matter touching upon aircraft in flight, and other enti-
ties' control over aircraft matters on the ground.6 5
Thus, the Court allowed the federal government to create a
uniform system for defensive and economic security, and se-
cured the Nation's direct control over the lesser aviation subject.
The Court also balanced and limited an expansion of federal
power by recognizing the diminished need for the uniform con-
trol of aircraft on the ground. Thus, various entities, including
the federal government, obtained control over aircraft not in
flight.
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., the Court stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the provisions before us impose
valid charges [state and local tax on each passenger ticket specifi-
cally to defray airport costs] on the use of airport facilities con-
structed and maintained with public funds. Furthermore, we do
not think that they conflict with any federal policies furthering
uniform national regulation of air transportation. No federal stat-
63 Federal Airport Act-Time for Grants, Etc., S. REP. No. 654, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2707, 2712. Indeed, time has not
altered this conception. Upon signing House Bill 904, a bill to ensure a competi-
tive airline industry, President WilliamJ. Clinton wrote: "The aviation industry is
important not only to our economy, but (as Operation Desert Storm demon-
strated just 2 years ago) to our national defense as well." Statement on Signing
Enabling Legislation for the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competi-
tive Airline Industry, I PuB. PAPERS 416 (Apr. 7, 1993).
64 Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 397 (1973)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
65 See City of Burbank v. Lockweed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1972);
Evansville, 405 U.S. at 720-21; Pan American, 371 U.S. at 310; Causby, 328 U.S. at
256-57; Northwest Airlines, 322 U.S. at 292; Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedar-
hurst, 132 F. Supp. 871, 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); Odom v. Pacific N. Airlines, Inc.,
393 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1964); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 317 A.2d 114
(Del. Ch. 1974); Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Nebraska Dep't of Aeronautics, 122




ute or specific congressional action or declaration evidences a
congressional purpose to deny or pre-empt state and local power
to levy charges designed to help defray the costs of airport con-
struction and maintenance. A contrary purpose is evident in the
Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970.66
In that circumstance, "[a] t least until Congress chooses to enact
a nation-wide rule, the power will not be denied to the
State[s]."67
Justice Douglas dissented on the basis of a citizen's right to
travel. According to Justice Douglas, getting onto a plane repre-
sented an intrastate act, and stepping off of a plane constituted an
act inseparable from flight. 6  The tax therefore cannot be an inte-
gral part of interstate commerce. 69 Thus, this "power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment."70
The Court dealt with economic issues concerning rates and
routes in both Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 71
and Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.72 In both cases,
the Court held that provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 ("FAA") 73 preempted state antitrust laws as applicable to
66 Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
707, 720-21 (1972) (emphasis added).
67 Id. at 722 (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1964)). Since Ev-
ansville, Congress has enacted the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973,
49 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West 1973) (repealed 1994); 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711-1727 (West
1973) (repealed 1982, 1994). This Act incorporated the below quoted bill's
intent:
The bill [prohibited] any government agency other than the
United States from establishing or levying a passenger head tax or
use tax on the carriage of persons in air transportation. This prohi-
bition will ensure that passengers and air carriers will be taxed at a
uniform rate-by the United States-and that local "head" taxes
will not be permitted to inhibit the flow of interstate commerce and
the growth and development of air transportation.
The provision is in response to ... Evansville ....
Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973, S. REP. No. 93-12, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1434, 1435, 1446. (Two other acts
passed by Congress also affected airports in various ways: The Airport and Airway
Development Acts of 1970 and of 1982).
68 Evansville, 405 U.S. at 722-26.
w Id.
70 Id. at 726 (quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)) (empha-
sis added).
71 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
72 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
73 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra note 62, § 1301.
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aircraft. Both decisions clearly reflected the Court's analysis of
flight, and the need and intent for uniformity thereover, as the
basis for preemption. As the Court stated in Pan American:
Limitation of routes and divisions of territories and the relation
of common carriers to air carriers are basic in this regulatory
scheme.
If the courts were to intrude independently with their con-
struction of the antitrust laws, two regimes might collide. Fur-
thermore, many of the problems presented by this case, which
involves air routes to and in foreign countries, may involve mili-
tary and foreign policy considerations that the Act, as construed
by a majority of the Court.... subjects to presidential rather than
judicial review. It seems to us, therefore, that the Act leaves to
the Board ... all questions of injunctive relief against the division
74of territories or the allocation of routes....
Perhaps the Court presented one of its most extensive and
definitive analyses for the use of the preemption doctrine over
aviation matters in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.75
In City of Burbank, the United States Supreme Court considered
the states' rights to enact statutes to control noise generated by
aircraft in flight during descent and take-off. The Court clearly
found that the need for uniform aviation flight systems necessi-
tated control of such only by the federal government. 76
The Court noted that "imposition of curfew ordinances on a
nationwide basis would cause a serious loss of efficiency in the
use of the navigable airspace. 77
[The Noise Control Act of 1972] reaffirms and reinforces the
conclusion that FAA, now in conjunction with EPA, has full con-
trol over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and local control....
Control of noise is of course deep-seated in the police power
of the States. Yet the pervasive control vested in EPA and in FAA
under the 1972 Act seems to us to leave no room for local cur-
fews or other local controls .... Any regulations adopted by the
Administrator to control noise pollution must be consistent with
the "highest degree of safety." The interdependence of these fac-
tors requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation
74 Pan American, 371 U.S. at 305, 310 (citation omitted).
75 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
76 Id. at 625-33.
77 Id. at 628.
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if the congressional objectives underlying the Federal Aviation Act
are to be fulfilled.78
The Court concluded: "There is, to be sure, no express provi-
sion of pre-emption in the 1972 Act. That, however, is not deci-
sive. . . . It is the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal
regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to conclude that there
is pre-emption. ' 79
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that such sweep-
ing implied preemption of state and local statutes violated the
basic division of legislative powers between the States and Con-
gress. 80 Neither the wording of the legislative history or the
Noise Control Act of 1972 indicated any congressional intent to
preempt states' legislation of noise control of aircraft. Further,
Congress could have easily provided an express preemption pro-
vision in the Act. According to Rehnquist, Congress failed to do
so, and the Court should not presume to do so. 81
Although Rehnquist raised seemingly valid points in the pre-
emption analysis, the majority in City of Burbank basically ig-
nored that issue, treating federal control (strike control)
preemption and control of all matters touching aircraft in flight
as a foregone conclusion. The majority remained concerned
about preempting once fundamental rights of land ownership
in order to accommodate new and different concepts created by
new technology. Accordingly, an exception was provided for
municipal proprietors on an otherwise complete preemption of
the noise control issue.8 2
But, we are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed by
the City of Burbank as a proprietor of the airport, but with the
exercise of police power .... Thus, authority that a municipality
may have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police
power. We do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a
municipality as a proprietor.8 3
Although inserted as a footnote in the Supreme Court deci-
sion, the lower federal and state courts sometimes seized on this
"exception" to assert state authority in aviation matters. Some
lower courts even rendered a few decisions seemingly at vari-
78 Id. at 633, 638-39 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
79 Id. at 633 (citation omitted).
80 Id. at 643.
81 Id. at 644, 653-54.
82 Id. at 635 n.14.
83 Id. at 636 n.14.
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ance with the intent of the majority's view in City of Burbank.
Such reaction indicated that the states share some control over
the aviation field.
It should be noted that as a sign of the times, the Court ex-
cepted matters of racial discrimination from any analysis. The
Court refused to tolerate racial discrimination in air transporta-
tion either on the ground or in the air and asserted exclusive
federal control over that subject. s8
C. OTHER COURTS' USE OF PREEMPTION FROM 1950 TO 1978
Interestingly, a perusal of state and lower federal court pre-
emption decisions over aviation matters indicates that such
courts generally followed the uniformity analysis expostulated by
the Supreme Court and reached similar conclusions. In fact,
some of these courts' decisions obviously foreshadowed the
above-cited Supreme Court decisions. However, a few states
managed to expound states' rights over the aviation subject pre-
mised on the flaws inherent in basing power only on congres-
sional intent.
The United States Supreme Court and the lower courts
reached similar conclusions about the purely economic issues
affecting the aviation industry. If case issues concerned various
entities' attempts to control rates, routes, or services of an air-
line, the lower courts characterized the conduct as interference
with aircraft in flight which affected the economic viability of
the aviation industry. In such cases, the lower courts found a
need for uniform regulation of the aviation industry through
federal controls, including the use of preemptive power.85
Presumably, these decisions coalesced with those of the
Supreme Court preempting antitrust actions dealing with air-
craft flight. However, the Delaware state courts sliced off a share
of that economic power from within the aviation field when the
issues did not directly, or even substantially, concern control of
aircraft in flight:
84 See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.,
372 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1963).
85 See Odom v. Pacific N. Airlines, Inc., 393 P.2d 112, 115-16 (Alaska 1964);
Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Nebraska Dept. of Aeronautics, 122 N.W.2d 476, 488
(Neb. 1963) ("It appears that Congress has pre-empted the field of interstate air
transportation in regard to the routes and points to be served by interstate air




The policy behind the Federal Aviation Act is primarily to cen-
tralize power in the public interest so as to... provide an agency
endowed with the authority to supervise airline rates and services.
There being no conflict, in my opinion, between federal policy
as to the operation of aeronautic companies and state law having
to do with corporate fiduciary duty, the present suit must... be
allowed to proceed. 6
In the matter of taxation, a state court acknowledged the gov-
ernment's fundamental right to tax other entities.8 However,
the state court decision supported congressional legislation par-
tially based on the flight analysis. The court preempted all state
or local ordinances requiring head taxes on flight passengers.8
Several lower court cases definitively followed precedent and
guaranteed the freedom of any entity's air flight over the rights
of landowners.8 9 The courts previously had declared navigable
airspace above the land as part of the public domain rather than
private property. In this era, the courts dealt the final blow to
all landowners' challenges to aircraft by declaring ascent and
descent flight paths part of the public domain and part of
flight." "The clear zones, as part of the navigable airspace, are
subject to federal regulation, and the orders of the [state] courts
infringed upon the federal power."91
New York state courts and two federal courts agreed upon one
essential conclusion:
'Absent congressional action, the familiar test ... is that of uni-
formity versus locality.... More accurately, the question is whether
the State interest is outweighed by a national interest in the un-
hampered operation of interstate commerce.
86 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 317 A.2d 114, 122 (Del. Ch. 1974)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added), aff'd, 336 A.2d 572 (Del. 1975).
87 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 309 A.2d 157, 159 (Pa. 1973).
88 Id. (relying on Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 1113(a), 87 Stat. 90 (1973)).
89 United States v. City of New Haven, 496 F.2d 452, 454 (2d Cir. 1974); Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1956);
United States v. City of New Haven, 367 F. Supp. 1338, 1340-41 (D. Conn. 1973);
City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750, 761-62 (D.N.J. 1958);
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871, 882-83
(E.D.N.Y. 1955); All American Airways, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 106 F. Supp.
521, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 201 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1953); Yoffee v. Penn-
sylvania Power & Light Co., 123 A.2d 636, 639 (Pa. 1956) ("The right of flight in
navigable unused air space is now as constitutionally established as the right to
walk through the public square.").
o City of Newark, 159 F. Supp. at 756.
91 City of New Haven, 496 F.2d at 454.
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It is apparent that Congress, by the enactment of the 1938 Aero-
nautics Act, adopted a comprehensive plan for the regulation of
air traffic in the navigable airspace....
Federal control and regulation of the traffic in the navigable air-
space includes the airspace through which aircraft necessarily fly
for take-offs from and landings at public airports.92
Unquestionably, since the 1950s any aircraft flight above mini-
mum safe altitude or in the landing or take-off path constituted
conduct in the public domain regulated and guarded by federal
power at the expense of the individual landowner. Any federal
or state court would preempt any interference with such flight.
The courts at least created definitive, comprehensive, and con-
sistent law on that much of the aviation subject.
Court decisions nullifying landowner challenges to in flight
aviation caused the local and state governments to step into the
individual's shoes. Some government bodies placed noise re-
strictions on flights. Such direct attacks on flight caused both
state and federal courts to make preemptive decisions which
foreshadowed, or thereafter supported, City of Burbank.9 3 Partic-
ularly since City of Burbank, courts accept a basic premise: "It
follows that City of Burbank requires that a municipal ordinance
resting on police power, which manages or dictates action by
aircraft in navigable airspace for the purpose of noise control, is
invalid under the preemption doctrine."94 During this era, the
92 Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. at 880-81 (quoting Zook, 336 U.S. at 728
for the proposition of the uniformity versus locality test) (emphasis added).
93 See American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1968); United States v. City of Blue Ash, 487 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Ohio 1978), aff'd,
621 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1980); British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 437 F. Supp. 804
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), modified, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977); American Airlines, Inc. v.
Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (forbidding noise
restricted flight at JFK International Airport; such a direct conflict with federal
law demanded preemption of such state laws), affl'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968);
Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago, 306 N.E.2d 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
94 City of Blue Ash, 487 F. Supp. at 137 (citation omitted); but see Loma Portal
Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 394 P.2d 548 (Cal. 1964) (prohibiting noise
ordinance based on the state's interest in furthering public services rather than
on an exclusive federal control of air navigation). The court held that "[t]he
definition and adjustment of property right and the protection of health and
welfare are matters primarily of state law." Id. at 554. The savings clause in the
CAA, according to the court, supports this conclusion. Id. at 555.
Divergent views having been expressed, other courts cited Loma as a basis for
assertions of state control over flight. See Stagg v. Municipal Court of Santa
Monica, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that federal preemption
did not apply to a city ordinance limiting hours for takeoff of jet aircraft).
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lower courts addressed the issue of title registration which still
remained unresolved by the United States Supreme Court. The
vast majority of courts agreed: "By providing a federal system
for registration of conveyances and liens affecting the title to
aircraft, Congress has preempted that field ... .-95 The states
never questioned the preemptive power of the federal regula-
tion on such matters, but contested its reach. 96
On the above-mentioned matters, the lower courts allowed for
broad federal control of the aviation subject, even if preserved
and strengthened by the use of preemptive force. Thus, on
these matters some degree of uniform and consistent law and
policy arose. Nowhere, however, are the courts' inherent flaws
of subjecting aviation matters to interpretation of congressional
intent rather than constitutional purpose as obvious as in the
uncertain, controversial, and destructive results stemming from
various courts' decisions in personal injury and tort cases.
Tort claims in aviation matters began to accelerate in the mid-
twentieth century and continue to plague the system. In the
mid-twentieth century, the lower courts seemed to adhere to an
in-flight or economic loss versus bodily injury analysis to deter-
mine the preemptive scope of federal regulations over state law
tort remedies. 97 The courts preempted state and local laws regu-
Although clearly contradictory to City of Burbank, the California courts refused to
completely relinquish control over flight, seizing on the illogical gaps in City of
Burbank caused by the "proprietor exception." See National Aviation v. City of
Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417, 421 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Air Transp. Ass'n of America v.
Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Although clearly doctrinaire that
the federal government controlled flight in the navigable airspace, hesitancy to
overturn badly reasoned law such as Loma, albeit part of the balancing act in the
federalist system, exemplifies the problems of continued controversies and dis-
crepancies which should be settled for the benefit of the industry and the Nation.
95 State Sec. Co. v. Aviation Enter. Inc., 355 F.2d 225, 229 (10th Cir. 1966).
96 See id. (finding state recording statutes not applicable to aircraft title instru-
ments); New Jersey v. Greene, 385 A.2d 896 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)
(holding that the registration statute not for same purpose as the FAA recorda-
tion statute so not preempted); McCormack v. Air Ctr., Inc., 571 P.2d 835, 838
(Okla. 1977) (holding that filing in accordance with FAA recording regulations
preempted all written instruments affecting title to the aircraft); Southern Jersey
Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 261 A.2d 399, 403 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970)
(finding federal law to be preemptive only as to recording, allowing state law to
apply to security interests).
97 Cf Odom, 393 P.2d at 115, 118; Frontier Airlines, Inc., 122 N.W.2d at 488 ("It
appears that Congress has preempted the field of interstate air transportation in
regard to the routes and points to be served by interstate air carriers .... ); but
see Melnick, 150 A.2d at 569; Frontier Airlines, Inc., 122 N.W.2d at 488 (state railway
commission had no authority and should have relinquished jurisdiction).
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lating airline rates, routes, or services based on an assumed pre-
cedent for economic uniformity and stability in the aviation
field. These decisions covered even personal property injury.
However, if plaintiffs alleged claims for physical injury, even oc-
curring in flight, almost all courts, for differing and illogical rea-
sons, refused to relinquish that specific court's jurisdiction.9
The United States Supreme Court failed to articulate a posi-
tion on jurisdictional supremacy over tort claims in aviation mat-
ters. The lower courts, predictably, refused to relinquish
control over such a vast subject matter, regardless of logic or
consequences, and despite the fact that the subject far surpassed
the boundaries of local jurisdiction.
The lower courts willingly recognized the need for national
control over most business and contractual aspects of the avia-
tion field and preempted state and local power. Those same
courts would not obligingly give up such fundamental power of
the states and locales, however, as control over tortious conduct
towards those entities' citizens. Only frequent, precedential,
comprehensive, and forceful preemption of those laws by the
United States could have accomplished such a result.
98 See, e.g., Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir.
1975) (failing to see a reason to develop federal contract law for regulated air
carriers); Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1393, 1395 (5th
Cir. 1970) (While under its commerce clause powers Congress could preempt
state law with regard to the liability for injuries resulting from air crashes, the
"commerce clause as interpreted by the Courts has left state sovereignty
unimpaired, except where Congress has clearly indicated an intent to supersede
state law."); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969)
("Congress intended to alter common law principles with a definitional section
of a regulatory scheme. The Federal Aviation Program . . . makes no provision
for its application to tort liability."); Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 452
(W.D. Wis. 1966) (should not generally infer civil remedy available from federal
regulatory statute in order to create uniform results in suits for injuries to passen-
gers); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 365 (S.D. Cal. 1961)
(violation of regulations control overbooking by airline and federal court may
grant individual remedy); Porter v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 42,
43 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (state court retained jurisdiction over claim for wrongful
death during air crash because the savings clause indicated congressional intent
not to preempt state court jurisdiction); McClenny v. United Air Lines, Inc., 178
F. Supp. 372, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1959) (air traffic control personnel governed by
regulations cannot acquire a duty or act negligently beyond the scope of regula-
tions concerning air crash); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916 (Alaska
1977) (doctrine of federal preemption of aviation law does not generally extend
to tort liability); Odom, 393 P.2d at 112 (if a tariff sets limit on amount awarded
for loss of personal belongings, the tariff controls the liability issue because Con-
gress intended that one agency be responsible for supervising rates and services).
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The federal entities completely abdicated this responsibility in
the mid-twentieth century and the states willingly filled the void.
The result has been conflicting precedential law on the subject.
By failing to forcefully use its preemptive powers to take con-
trol of the entire subject matter and create a uniform aviation
law by the mid-twentieth century, the Nation differed from
other nations. However, during this time the United States
signed the Warsaw Convention ("the Convention") and in most
applicable instances followed the Convention's differing prece-
dents. America's failure to adopt precedents similar to those in
the international aviation field seriously impaired America's avi-
ation growth and position in the international sphere.
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., a passenger sued Swissair
for alleged negligent acts which caused the passenger bodily in-
juries and mental anguish. 9
The court found:
[T]he Warsaw Convention is a treaty to which the United States
has adhered, it is the supreme law of the land and is, by its terms,
applicable to this case....
There can be no question that this uniformity was and is in-
tended to result from a limitation on and a presumption of
liability....
To regulate in a uniform manner the liability of the carrier,
they must have intended to be comprehensive. To effect the
treaty's avowed purpose, the types of injuries enumerated should
be construed expansively to encompass as many types of injury as
are colorably within the ambit of the enumerated types. Mental
and psychosomatic injuries are colorably within that ambit and
are, therefore, comprehended by Article 17.100
The court concluded:
(1) [T]hat, if and only if Articles 17, 18, and 19 comprehend the
type of injury alleged, then the Warsaw system exclusively condi-
tions and limits the liability to which the carrier may be subject
for that injury, regardless of its ultimate cause; (2) that the
phrase 'death or wounding . . . or any other bodily injury,' as
used in Article 17, does comprehend mental injuries; and (3)
9 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Husserl was abrogated by Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
100 Husseri 388 F. Supp. at 1243-44, 1250.
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that the otherwise applicable substantive law must provide the
appropriate cause of action for the injuries alleged. 1 '
Since such clear delineation of preemptive subjects and guar-
anteed limits of liability have worked within the federation of
international nations, a similar system should work within the
precepts of American federalism.
IV. THE COURTS' USE OF THE PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE IN AVIATION LITIGATION FROM 1978
TO 1990
A. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AVOIDS THE
DIFFICULT AVIATION QUESTIONS IN THE SECOND HALF
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Litigation over aviation matters increased from 1978 to 1990.
The more voluminous and contentious litigation in this era
often seemed to cause the courts to indecisively and inconsis-
tently apply the preemption doctrine to aviation matters. Prece-
dent lost adhesion and results have sometimes been fragmented
and incomprehensible. Nevertheless, during this time, the
United States Supreme Court considered only six cases which
dealt with the preemptive reach of the federal government into
the aviation sphere and none of these concerned the most diffi-
cult controversies.
Three of the cases dealt with the fundamental, and often dis-
cussed, the topic of each sovereign's ability to tax aviation mat-
ters. In all of the cases the Supreme Court reiterated its basic
flight/ground analysis for deciding aviation tax matters based
on Congressional intent. In Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation,
the State of Hawaii passed laws which allowed the state to tax
that part of any airline's annual gross income made during the
airline's operations in Hawaii.1" 2 The Court recognized that af-
ter its decision in Evansville, Congress passed legislation which
forbade states to collect any indirect or direct charge on passen-
gers and that this inhibited freedom of flight. The Court char-
acterized Hawaii's annual tax as a gross receipts tax on all
passengers flying through Hawaii rather than as an aircraft
property tax. Thus, the federal legislation preempted Hawaii's
state laws validating the tax. 10 3
101 Id. at 1253.
102 464 U.S. 7 (1983).
103 Id. at 11-14.
344
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
In direct contrast, during this same era, the Supreme Court
decided Western Airlines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization.10 4 Again,
the Court recognized the Congressional legislative foundation
for its decision. 105 The Court detailed Congressional acts specif-
ically passed since 1970 to improve the Nation's entire air trans-
portation system, including the airports. Congress designated
the airport system crucial to the Nation's commercial, postal,
and military security. Congress intended to incorporate airports
into the fabric of those federal laws created to tax aviation enti-
ties and use the funds acquired therefrom to improve and con-
trol the entire aviation sphere. 1
0 6
Based on the controlling analysis that the federal government
possessed exclusive power over aircraft in flight, but diverse enti-
ties gained power over aviation matters on the ground, the
Court noted express exceptions within congressional legislation
for state taxation of certain aviation matters. 10 7 Whereas, in
Aloha Airlines, the Court held that federal law preempted Ha-
waii's state laws because they directly taxed passengers.' The
Court, however, held that the federal law excepted the South
Dakota tax on Western Airlines "because the South Dakota Air-
line Flight Property Tax is an 'in lieu tax which is wholly utilized
for airport and aeronautical purposes,"' and therefore does not
violate Section 1513(d) of the Airport and Airway Improvement
Act of 1982."9
Again based on the flight/ground aviation analysis, in Wardair
Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court
allowed the state of Florida to impose a tax on aviation fuel used
by foreign carriers in international travel. 10 Relying entirely
upon federal legislation to justify its decision, the Court found
that an essential component in an aircraft consisted of the fuel
which personnel loaded onto the aircraft from the ground.
Thus, the Court decided that Congress intended for the state to
share in the tax apportionment of that aircraft as property."'
Whether aviation fuel oil becomes an integral part of an air-
craft represented a debatable proposition. Indeed, the Court's
104 480 U.S. 123 (1987).
105 Id. at 124-25.
106 Id. at 124-34.
107 Id.
108 Aloha Airlines, 464 U.S. at 8-10.
1- Western Airlines, 480 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
110 477 U.S. 1, 1-21 (1986).
In Id.
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improvisations in Wardair disclosed the Court's verbally unrec-
ognized weakness of always determining the use and scope of
federal preemptive powers solely on its interpretations of the in-
tent of Congress. All of the decisions, however, clearly indicate
that the Court decided Congress intended that the various sov-
ereigns' abilities to tax aviation matters depended on the taxa-
ble topic's characterizations as either subjects in flight over
which the federal government possessed exclusive control or
subjects on the ground over which various entities might gain a
share of control.
In Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, the United States Supreme
Court conclusively decided the FAA recordation issue that had
been plaguing the lower courts when it held that:' 12
This case presents the question whether the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, prohibits all transfers of title to aircraft from having va-
lidity against innocent third parties unless the transfer has been
evidenced by a written instrument, and the instrument has been
recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration. We con-
clude that the Act does have such effect." 13
In Philko, the Court found that a seller sold the same plane to
two different people. 1 4 The first buyer never recorded the sale
with the Federal Aviation Administration. Philko, the second
buyer, did so. When the two buyers disputed ownership, Philko
claimed that his recordation gave him priority ownership rights.
The state court, however, decided that the recordation regula-
tion did not preempt state substantive law which in this instance
provided the first buyer with priority title to the aircraft." 5
The United States Supreme Court disagreed:
[B]ecause of these federal requirements, state laws permitting
undocumented or unrecorded transfers are pre-empted, for
there is a direct conflict between § 503(c) and such state laws,
and the federal law must prevail. These conclusions are dictated
by the legislative history .... Thus, since Congress intended to re-
quire the recordation of a conveyance evidencing each transfer of
an interest in aircraft, Congress must have intended to pre-empt
any state law under which a transfer without a recordable convey-
ance would be valid against innocent transferees or lienholders
who have recorded." 16
112 462 U.S. 406, 407 (1983).
113 Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 407 (citations omitted).
"14 Id. at 407-08.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
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The Court's decision brought some uniformity and fairness to
otherwise widely divergent state court decisions. Yet, the Court
remained ever mindful of its balancing act and the states' pow-
ers within the federal system:
[A] ccordingly, we hold that state laws allowing undocumented or
unrecorded transfers of interests in aircraft to affect innocent
third parties are pre-empted by the federal Act .... As one com-
mentator has explained: 'The only situation in which priority ap-
pears to be determined by operation of the [federal] statute is
where the security holder has failed to record his interest. Such
failure invalidates the conveyance as to innocent third persons.
But recordation itself merely validates; it does not grant
priority. 17
The fifth and most influential case, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., only indirectly addressed the aviation subject at the time.
The importance of the case related to Congress's recent passage
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) legis-
lation and the comprehensive regulations pertinent thereto.' 1 8
In Shaw, Delta Air Lines provided various medical and disabil-
ity benefits to employees through benefits plans.11 9 The plans
did not provide benefits to employees disabled by pregnancy, a
violation of the New York Human Rights Law and Disability Ben-
efits Law. The Court determined that ERISA legislation pre-
empted New York's Human Rights Law insofar as such
prohibited practices were lawful under federal law. The con-
gressional legislation did not preempt the Disability Benefits
Law. ' 20
In the context of ERISA, the Court defined the term "relate
to" for purposes of evaluating the scope of preemption. Based
on legislative history, the Court determined that the federal gov-
ernment passed ERISA statutes to develop uniform employee
benefits plans and displace state action over the subject.' 2' ER-
ISA preempted state laws, however, only insofar as a state plan
related to a plan covered by ERISA. Some state laws were con-
sidered to be too remote to relate to ERISA. But laws which
117 Id. at 412-13 (quoting Michael Scott, Liens in Aircraft Priorities, 25J. AiR L. &
CoM. 193, 203 (1958)).
118 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
119 Id. at 92.
120 Id. at 92, 108-09.
121 Id.
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affected matters connected with or referenced to an ERISA plan
related thereto. 122
In the ERISA context, the Court also dealt with the anomaly
of interpreting comprehensive federal legislation which con-
tained both express preemption provisions and savings clauses.
The Court admonished Congress to "fix" clearly conflicting lan-
guage within its statutes. 123 The Court, however, determined
the intent of Congress in this instance was to retain broad pre-
emptive power over state benefit plans rather than preempt its
own powers from its own language: 124
While [the savings clause] § 514(d) may operate to exempt provi-
sions of state laws upon which federal laws depend for their en-
forcement, the combination of Congress' enactment of an all-
inclusive pre-emption provision and its enumeration of narrow,
specific exceptions to that provision makes us reluctant to ex-
pand § 514(d) into a more general savings clause. 125
Relying on Congress to draft clear and definitive language deter-
minative of the use of the preemption doctrine to define the
scope of federal power and delineate the boundaries of federal-
ism may have been one of the biggest flaws of twentieth century
judicial interpretation.
One other Supreme Court case of this era related to aviation
matters. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of
America, the Court addressed the liability of the airline for dis-
criminating against its female cabin attendants.12 6 Such conduct
was governed entirely by federal statute. The damage incurred
through such conduct derived from the comprehensive legisla-
tive scheme. The Court had no authority to provide a new rem-
edy not adapted by Congress. 127 The Court noted: "A narrow
exception to the limited lawmaking role of the federal judiciary
is found in admiralty. We consistently have interpreted the
grant of general admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts as a
proper basis for the development of judge-made rules of mari-
time law .. "128
Prior to the inception of the Union, ships plied the seas in a
world unconfined by landed restrictions, and virtually free of
122 Id. at 99 n.20, 96-100, 100 n.21.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 104-05.
125 Id. at 104.
126 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 95-96.
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political control. Upon creation, Nation states recognized the
uniqueness of the maritime subject but desired political and
economic control over such a powerful and boundless entity.
Nations developed a unique federal judicial jurisdiction over
maritime matters and a federal set of laws applicable to the
unique maritime enterprise. 129
Thus, the Union practically placed maritime matters beyond
the federalist system which the maritime system predated, but
theoretically found a niche for the subject matter within federal-
ism. It has been suggested that the similarity of aviation pursuits
(planes flying through international air untethered to land
boundaries) to maritime pursuits (ships sailing through endless
international waters unable even to maneuver on land) de-
mands that the Court create applicable unique federal law as
well for the aviation subject even though it evolved more than a
hundred years after the Union.
Upon clear thought, and comparison, the Court should have
explored the multitudinous analogies between the aviation and
maritime subjects. At the very least, the Court and the Nation
should have otherwise analogized the positive aspects of the
Warsaw Convention to our aviation concepts.
Instead, the Court seemed obsessed with predicating all laws
on Congressional intent, or lack thereof, which made the Court
squeeze aviation matters into the confining boundaries of the
constant contests for power and resultant balancing acts within
the modern American federalist system. Such a narrow focus
and interpretation of our Constitution damaged the aviation
subject, and the impossibility of attempting to confine a virtually
limitless concept within traditional precedents weakened the
bonds and innovations in the federalist system.
B. OTHER SIGNIFICANT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ABOUT PREEMPTION MADE BETWEEN 1978
AND 1990 APPLICABLE TO AVIATION MATTERS
In two other cases decided between 1978 and 1990, the
United States Supreme Court dealt with the anomaly of express
preemption provisions and a savings clause in federal legislation
involving the same legislation.1 31
12 See id. at 95-99. See generally Gibbons, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 1.
130 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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The two pre-emption sections, while clear enough on their faces,
perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting, for while the gen-
eral pre-emption clause broadly pre-empts state law, the savings
clause appears broadly to preserve the States' lawmaking power
over much of the same regulation. While Congress occasionally
decides to return to the States what it has previously taken away,
it does not normally do both at the same time ....
Long aware of this problem, commentators have recommended
that Congress amend the pre-emption provisions to clarify its in-
tentions .. 131
In Pilot Life, the Court reiterated this concern, stating, "In Metro-
politan Life, this Court, not[ed] that the pre-emption and savings
clauses 'perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting." '32
In Metropolitan Life, the Court found that the savings clause
saved other federally legislated benefit plans from the preemp-
tive power of ERISA's language. 133 In Pilot Life, the Court found
that the express preemption provisions provided strong evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to "save" state law remedies
not incorporated into ERISA.13 1
Miring its reasoning in the contradictory language of congres-
sional legislation caused inconsistent or at the very least, barely
distinguishable decisions by the Court.135 Even more so, such
reasoning caused the Court to make questionable decisions
when the Court wished to distance itself from the intent of Con-
gress on a precise subject. 136
In Silkwood the Court considered the conflict between the
states' traditional authority to provide tort remedies to its citi-
zens and the federal government's exclusive regulatory author-
ity over the safety aspects of nuclear power. 137
In an attempt to award damages to the estate of an individual
killed, and possibly murdered, by personnel manning a nuclear
reactor, the Supreme Court skewed the exclusive and explicit
intent of Congress to control nuclear power operations.1 3 The
Court allowed a private party to recover punitive damages for
131 Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739-40, 740 n.16.
132 Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739).
133 Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744.
134 Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
135 See id.; Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744.
136 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
137 Id. at 248.
138 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1982) (factual
implications and innuendos relied on by the court); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
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safety violations against an entity which the Court had previously
held to be controlled, regulated, and monitored by the federal
government. 139 Furthermore, the Court shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant corporation "to show that Congress in-
tended to preclude such [punitive damage] awards."'14
Dissenting Justices pointed out the Court's inconsistencies in
interpreting congressional intent. In one decision, the Court
preempted all safety regulation of nuclear power from state ju-
risdiction. In another decision, the Court allowed the states to
award punitive damage awards to private individuals for viola-
tions of regulations stipulated, defined, and forced upon the nu-
clear entity by the federal government.1 41
Another dissenting Justice commented:
I would find preemption of punitive damage awards because they
conflict with the fundamental concept of comprehensive federal
regulation of nuclear safety .... It is not reasonable to infer that
Congress intended to allow juries or lay persons, selected essen-
tially at random, to impose unfocused penalties solely for the
purpose of punishment and some undefined deterrence. These
purposes wisely have been left within the regulatory authority
and discretion of the NRC. 142
The Court appears to reason congressional intent in the con-
text of a specific case based on a specific set of facts. When each
dispute must be resolved with an interpretation of more con-
gressional language and intent as to each new set of facts rather
than a general comprehensible purpose, the precedents tend to
gain more wordings and lose definiteness. Additionally, the
lower courts needed to apply the precedential language used by
the United States Supreme Court to resolve completely different
sets of facts. This led to fragmented and inconsistent decisions
on many aviation matters.
C. LOWER COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING AVIATION MATTERS
FROM 1978 TO 1990
Most courts relied on City of Burbank, resulting in continuity in
the control of aircraft noise during this era. 43 "The only basis
139 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248-58.
140 Id. at 255.
141 Id. at 258-64 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 281-83 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (citation omitted).
143 See, e.g., United States v. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); United States v. New York, 552 F. Supp. 255 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
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other than proprietary power for enactment of the ordinances
was the police power, and as exercises of the police power Bur-
bank requires that the ordinances be found unconstitutional as
violations of the supremacy clause."' 44 A few states and locales
persisted in challenging the decision throughout the 1980s to
regain a piece of the action.1 4 5
In Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, the
California Court of Appeals held that congressional legislation
did not preempt causes of action which challenged aircraft noise
characterized as a nuisance because of the presence of the sav-
ings clause in the FAA. 146 The court justified its holding:
The fundamental fallacy ... lies in [the] assumption that ex-
cessive airport noise results only from the presence ofjet aircraft
in flight without recognizing that such possibly objectionable
presence is also due to the existence of an airport whose loca-
tion, runways, and noise abatement procedures, among other
things, are under the direct and immediate control . . . of the
airport proprietor. In other words, airport noise control is essen-
tially a shared responsibility of the federal government and the
airport proprietor.
Moreover, the allowance of local nuisance actions against ex-
cessive airport noise constitutes a much lesser intrusion upon na-
tional aviation noise abatement policy than the local night
curfew of jet aircraft takeoffs involved in the Burbank case.147
District courts and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals simi-
larly concluded that "the power of a municipal proprietor to
regulate the use of its airport is not preempted by federal legisla-
tion.... The legislative history shows that Congress intended
that municipal proprietors enact reasonable regulations to es-
tablish acceptable noise levels for airfields and their
environs. 148
Citing the "proprietary exception" and legislative history,
some California courts have bypassed the definitive intent of City
of Burbank to place exclusive control of the residual effects of
144 Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006, 1009 (11th Cir. 1983).
145 Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988) (based on
Silkwood, state law remedies for airport noise and pollution even if noise ordi-
nances preempted); Krueger v. Mitchell, 332 N.W.2d 733 (Wis. 1983); Owen v.
City of Atlanta, 277 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. App.), aff'd, 282 S.E.2d 906 (Ga. 1981).
146 152 Cal. Rptr. 878, 881 (Cal. App.), vacated, 603 P.2d 1329 (Cal. 1979).
147 Id. (citations omitted).
148 Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100, 104 (9th
Cir. 1981); see also Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F.
Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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aircraft flight in the hands of the federal government. In con-
trast, some California courts have emphatically supported the
reasoning in City of Burbank.
In San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found:
The supremacy clause invalidates any exercise of state power that
unduly frustrates or obstructs the objectives of legitimate na-
tional policy.
[I] t is clear that City of Burbank did not rest solely on pervasive
regulation. Indeed, the national character of the subject matter
was said to be 'the critical issue.'
Our analysis of the pertinent state and federal regulations
leads us to conclude that the curfew imposed . . . impinges on
airspace management .... The state has attempted to act in an
area preempted by the federal government and its actions are
void. 149
The court further found:
[Proprietors are exempted] .... [b]ut before an entity may pos-
sess this power, it must bear the responsibility ... for excessive
aircraft noise....
These criteria (ownership, operation, promotion, and the abil-
ity to acquire necessary approach easements) comprise a federal
definition of proprietors for preemption purposes....
Without such liability, however, congressional intent, as found in
City of Burbank, precludes control under the police power, and
CalTrans' argument fails.150
In Bethman v. City of Ukiah, the California Court of Appeals
found:
[P]laintiffs essentially request this court to hold that navigation
facilities which were adequate under FAA standards were inade-
quate and to impose upon [municipal airport owners] the duty
to establish additional standards and requirements. Such a
holding would be inconsistent with the FAA's exclusive authority
to make these determinations.5i
Are California courts unable to discern any inconsistency in
these decisions? The courts allowed, and even required, munici-
149 651 F.2d 1306, 1310, 1312 n.l, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
15o Id. at 1317, 1318 n.33.
15, 265 Cal. Rptr. 539, 547 (Cal. App. 1989).
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pal airport owners to make additional standards for aircraft
noise levels (an integral part of aircraft structure and flight) al-
ready covered by numerous federal acts. But the same courts
excused, and even forbade, the same owners from establishing
additional navigational controls (only partially an integral part
of aircraft and on the ground) only covered by some FAA
regulations.
Earlier courts seemed to make a definitive and encompassing
judicial decision about aircraft noise control. A minority view
developed in the 1980s which provided viable precedent and in-
creased challenges to federal control over any aviation matter
attendant on an airport concept. So long as courts and legisla-
tors make rules about each individual aviation matter on the
facts of each single and specific case, fragmentation, inconsis-
tency, and uncertainty will permeate the aviation industry.
Of course, with the United States Supreme Court's continued
silence on the subject, the lower courts struggled with the scope,
if any, of preemptive power over personal injury claims. The
majority of courts decided that "there would.., be no justifica-
tion for concluding that ... Congress intended to occupy the
field of liability for personal injuries."'52
Other courts, however, have recognized the overwhelming
problems in applying these traditional remedies in unique and
untraditional occurrences and have pleaded for "[t]he immedi-
ate passage of a uniform law which will govern the issues of lia-
bility and damages in mass tort litigation." '153 Such law "is an
absolute necessity if an efficient administration of justice .. .is
to be achieved." 15
4
152 Ravreby v. United Airlines, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1980) (quoting
James C. McKay, Airline Tariff Provisions as a Bar to Actions for Personal Injuries, 18
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 160, 190 (1950)). See In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton
Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo. on Nov. 15, 1987, 721 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Colo. 1988)
(compliance with regulations did not establish as a matter of law that the defend-
ant was not liable for traditional tort law remedies); Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 691 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1984) (because of reasoning in Silkwood, and existence
of savings clause in FAA, the court allowed state law remedies for a private party
harmed by violator of FAA regulations unless the defendant carried burden of
proof on presumption).
153 In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp. 793,




Lower courts preempted state laws in the area of parachute
jumping, 5 5 pilot regulation,'56 and some areas involving control
of helicopter operation. 57
The increased aviation litigation of the 1980s began to illumi-
nate the weaknesses inherent in the twentieth century courts'
adversarial system, which allowed different or multiple spheres
of power to control each separate part of the aviation subject
balanced by preemptive powers based only on congressional
language.
Although by this time precedential law governed some aspects
of aviation matters, inconsistent and controversial decisions ran
rampant over other matters in the same subject area. A federal-
ist system required shared power, but a strong and balanced fed-
eralist system required a positive knowledge of which part
controlled what portion of power over each subject matter to
unite all of the parts into a larger whole. Still, the biggest chal-
lenge to the vitality of aviation law only just began to appear
over the horizon in the late 1980s.
By the 1970s, the courts could usually be relied on to resolve
the balance of powers over economic controversies in aviation
matters based on the flight/ground dichotomy of exclusive fed-
eral control/shared control and interpretation of Congressional
intent as such. The judiciary's historic attempts to gain and
then balance the control of each governmental sphere over the
fledgling aviation business had coincided with the need for reg-
ulatory control, or the perceived need, therefore, to support the
155 Blue Sky Entertainment, Inc. v. Town of Gardiner, 711 F. Supp. 678, 694
(N.D.N.Y. 1989) (preempted because of the pervasiveness of federal law in the
area of parachute jumping).
156 Hill v. NTSB, 886 F.2d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1989) (FAA clearly had juris-
diction to deter future unsafe conduct by the pilot); French v. Pan Am Express,
Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1989) (the federal web was apparent in pilot qualifi-
cation, and all flight plans led to Washington).
157 Command Helicopters, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 691 F. Supp. 1148, 1150-51
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (Congress impliedly preempted local regulation of helicopter
external-loading operations); Gateway Motels, Inc. v. Municipality of Mon-
roeville, 525 A.2d 478, 481 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (although federal regulations
preempt local regulation of airspace and pilot qualifications, Congress could not
have intended to shear state and local governments of control over helistops).
See H.R. REP'. No. 95-1211, 15th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, at 73 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3767 (additional views of Elliot H. Levitas) ("The United
States has the finest and safest aviation system in the world, and it has generally
performed outstanding service for the American travelling and shipping public.
Nevertheless, the industry has been highly regulated since its inception .
See also CAA, supra note 38; FAA supra note 62.
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economic growth and stability of this and many other businesses
from the early twentieth century until the 1970s.
However, just as the system seemed to be establishing a consis-
tent judicial conception of economic matters, Congress deter-
mined a need to entirely revamp the regulation. Specifically,
for whatever reason, Congress found the aviation business in se-
rious financial difficulties by the 1970s. Generalizing that the
aviation industry maintained the economic resources, and knew
how to best use them given the opportunity, Congress decided
to release the industry from its regulatory restraints in order to
revitalize the financial condition of the aviation business.1 58
In contemplation of just such a policy, Congress passed the
Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) in 1978 to add to, and act in
conjunction with, the FAA.' 59 Congress included an express
preemption provision in this legislation. 160 What explicitly did
Congress intend to preempt, and how should this revitalize the
158 H.R. REP. No. 95-1211, at 73.
[T]he present regulatory system has not always been in the best
financial interest of the carriers and the consumers. Congress now
has the opportunity to make some changes in the existing restric-
tive, snail-paced regulatory system in which the industry opera-
dons. . . . The time has come to move decision making to the
private boardrooms of the industry and away from the lawyers,
economists, and bureaucrats at the CAB.... [I] t is time to move
the airline industry into a more competitive arena where it will have
an opportunity to grow in a period of healthy and profitable
competition.
Id.
159 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1742 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1994).
160 49 U.S.C.A. § 1305.
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or
political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other polit-
ical agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law,
rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and
effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier
having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air
transportation.
Id. § 1305(a)(1).
In July 1994, Congress repealed, revised, and recodified the Federal Aviation
Act as the FAA Act. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-49105 (1994). Congress intended
§ 41713 of the Act to replace § 1305. However, Congress made only minor
changes (see infra), and obviously intended the original meaning to remain.
Thus, cases containing statements pertaining to § 1305 retain validity.
Section 41713(b)(1) states that "[a] State ... may not enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under
this subpart." 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
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aviation industry? The solution to these questions represented a
challenge to the lower courts in the 1990s as they began to strug-
gle with the intent, scope, and interrelationship of the added
provisions to the aviation subject. This also changed and unset-
tled the judicial landscape in all aviation aspects, once again.
In one of the earliest decisions concerning the interpretation
of Section 1305, a federal court revised the impact of the eco-
nomic regulatory provisions of the FAA."' Testimony alleged
that state charges on intrastate carriers could cause airlines to
raise interstate rates. The court determined that by passing the
ADA, Congress intended to preempt any state law affecting air-
line economics. The court held that states could no longer reg-
ulate exempted carriers or the intrastate services of certified
carriers. 162
Another early decision preempted state laws covering air
cargos based upon the intent of Congress after passage of the
ADA to return the air cargo industry to "competitive market
forces." 163 Another, based on Section 1305, preempted deci-
sions which denied an air corporation entry into the air ambu-
lance service. 164 Given the explicit preemptive language in the
ADA, a congressional act, these courts found it easy to preempt
state laws in the initial cases because the statutes clearly regu-
lated "economic" affairs.
The controversies began when attorneys defended injury
claims on the basis of Section 1305 language. Courts initially
split over the interpretation of the definition and, therefore, the
preemptive scope of services. Some courts used the word to re-
strict the preemptive scope. 165 Others broadened it. 166
161 Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utils. Comm'n Cal., 644 F.2d 1334, 1336 (9th
Cir. 1981).
162 Id. at 1339-41.
163 Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Barnes Elec., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 640, 644 (N.D.
Ind. 1982) (court did not dismiss completely on preemption and instead held
that more facts were necessary to determine if plaintiffs personal breach of con-
tract claim remained).
164 Hiawatha Aviation v. Minnesota Dept. of Health, 375 N.W.2d 496 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985), affid, 389 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1986).
165 Dienfenthal v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982) (services
like smoking and beverage supply still regulated by federal law and § 1305 not
applicable thereto); Salley v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.
La. 1989) (state law claims not in conflict with any provision of the FAA are not
preempted).
166 O'Carroll v. American Airlines Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1989) (section
1305 preempted all state law claims; passed after enactment of the savings clause
so § 1305 indicated controlling congressional intent); Hingson v. Pacific South-
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The lower courts were also divided over the federal govern-
ment's preemption of state deceptive advertising laws concern-
ing airlines. Some courts saved the state laws, 67 whereas others
found them to be preempted. 16
On at least one aspect of aviation law during this era, and de-
spite a case decision which heavily criticized the Warsaw Con-
vention limitations, 169 courts continued to hold that "[t]here is
no question that, when a state cause of action is in conflict with
the provisions of the Convention, the conflicting provision of
the state action will be preempted by the applicable provisions
of the Convention." 170
V. WILL THE COURTS' USE OF THE PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE IN AVIATION LITIGATION IN THE NINETIES
FLY INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
In the 1990s, the courts still insisted on, and clung to, inter-
pretations of congressional intent as the only means to define
the scope of federal preemptive powers in aviation and other
matters. Predictably, the courts only confused and fragmented
the issues and power struggles. This struggle intensified dramat-
ically as courts decided the scope of the ADA. How the courts
will realign the balance of powers to secure the future of avia-
tion and the Nation constitutes the judiciary's never ending di-
lemma as we hurl ourselves headlong into the twenty-first
century.
west Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984) (state regulation of seating policies
for handicapped persons preempted by § 1305).
167 New York v. Trans World Airlines, 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (fed-
eral authority to regulate deceptive advertising derived not from § 1305, but from
§ 411; § 1506 preserved state actions within § 411 purview or New York's applica-
ble laws too remote to be related to the preemptive scope of the language of
rates, routes, and services).
- Illinois Corp. Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.
Ill. 1988), aff'd, 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989) (changing prices of tickets affected
rates and state laws affecting same are all preempted under § 1305).
169 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C.
1985), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
170 Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D. Fla. 1986). Accord
Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d
400 (9th Cir. 1983).
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A. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES SOME LEGAL
CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THE ADA BUT
CONTINUES TO AVOID THE MAJOR AVIATION
CONTROVERSY OF THE LAST
QUARTER OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The first five years of the 1990s spawned as much litigation
about the scope of preemptive powers over aviation matters as
all of the other years in the Nation's history combined. Never-
theless, during this time, the United States Supreme Court is-
sued only three decisions that were in any way connected to
such matters. None dealt directly with personal injury issues
even though the other courts vehemently disagreed on the is-
sue. However, the Justices did discuss the scope of the ADA's
preemption provision in two of the decisions. Lower courts
used the ADA reasoning and applied it to other claims with vary-
ing degrees of consistency.
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the majority of the
United States Supreme Court found federal intent to preempt
certain issues based on the Congressional language in Section
1305 of the ADA.17' Attorney generals of several states
threatened to sue airlines under the various states' general con-
sumer protection statutes to prohibit allegedly deceptive airline
fare advertisements. The airlines countered that Section 1305
preempted the state law claims.172
Of course the issue for the Court, "at bottom, [was] one of
statutory intent," and the Court began with the language em-
ployed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary mean-
ing of that language accurately expressed the legislative
purpose.'73 The key to determining congressional intent in en-
acting Section 1305 lay in the meaning of the words "relat[ing]
to," which expressed a broad preemptive power comparable to
preemption under ERISA.174 The Court thought it "appropriate
to adopt the same standard here: State enforcement actions hav-
ing a connection with or reference to airline 'rates, routes, or
services' are preempted under... § 1305." 175
171 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
172 Id. at 379-80.
'73 Id. at 383.
174 Id. at 383-84 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96; Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47; and
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739, among others).
175 Id. at 384.
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The Court found nothing in the language of Section 1305 to
limit its preemptive scope to inconsistent state regulation. "'The
pre-emption provision . . . displace [s] all state laws that fall
within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent
with ERISA's substantive requirements. '"'176
Nor did the general savings clause within the FAA limit the
broad preemptive scope of Section 1305. The Court had based
its decisions in this century on congressional statutory language.
Thus, the Court had to explain and reconcile the seemingly con-
flicting words of the savings clause provisions of the FAA with
those of the preemptive provisions of the ADA. What in actual-
ity, yet again, probably only represented another example of
poor legislative drafting and oversight, the Court chose to ex-
plain rationally rather than confront as a weakness.
The Court found that "it is a commonplace of statutory con-
struction that the specific governs the general, a canon particu-
larly pertinent here, where the 'savings' clause is a relic of the
pre-ADA/no pre-emption regime. A general 'remedies' saving
clause cannot be allowed to supersede the specific substantive
pre-emption provision."' 77 Additionally, "[s]uffice it to say that
legislative history need not confirm the details of changes in the
law effected by statutory language before we will interpret that
language according to its natural meaning."'' 78
Based on the statutory language, the Court likened this case
to Pilot Life, where the Court "held that a common-law tort and
contract action seeking damages for the failure of an employee
benefit plan to pay benefits 'relate[d] to' employee benefit
plans .. .was preempted by ERISA."' 179
To further support its statutory interpretation, the Court ex-
amined the economic implications of the case. An unques-
tioned purpose of the ADA included preventing state
interference in the economic matters of the aviation industry.8 0
"In any event, beyond the guidelines' express reference to fares,
it is clear as an economic matter that state restrictions on fare
advertising have the forbidden significant effect upon fares. Ad-
176 Id. at 387 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S.
825, 829 (1988), and Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739).
177 Morales, 504 U.S. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
178 Id. at 385 n.2 (emphasis added).
179 Id. at 388.
180 Id. at 378.
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vertising 'serves ... an indispensable role on the allocation of
resources. "
181
The Court established that the states' guidelines impacted air-
line fares enough to definitionally relate to the airlines' rates,
routes and services. The Court therefore held that the ADA pre-
empted the fare advertising provisions of all states' guidelines.
182
The Court appropriately balanced the powers in this decision by
granting vast preemptive power to the federal government but
reminding all that the effects of some state conduct on rates,
routes, and services were too remote or tenuous for federal ac-
tion to preempt such conduct.183
The dissenting Justices in Morales did not particularly contest
the majority's opinion so much as sidestep it. Based on a review
of the extensive history of aviation legislation, including the en-
actment of the ADA, the dissent agreed that Congress intended
to preempt state actions over any economic matters with signifi-
cant impact on the aviation industry. "Accordingly, we con-
clude that preemption extends to all of the economic factors
that go into the provision of the quid pro quo for passenger's fare,
including flight frequency and timing, liability limits, reserva-
tion and boarding practices, insurance, smoking rules, meal ser-
vice, entertainment, bonding and corporate financing .... 184
The dissenting Justices opined, however, that the airline in-
dustry failed to prove that the states' guidelines in any way signif-
icantly affected airlines' rates. Thus, guidelines enacted to
affect the nature of advertising only remotely affected airline
fares. Additionally, Congress failed to eliminate parts of the
FAA, such as Section 411 which covered deceptive practices and
Section 1506, the savings clause, when Congress enacted Section
1305. These actions indicated Congress's intent to continue the
airlines' liability to the states if the airlines engaged in deceptive
or misleading advertising.18 5
All of the Justices agreed that Congress enacted the ADA to
unshackle the aviation industry from most federal economic reg-
ulation. Congress added Section 1305 to prevent state entities
181 Id. at 388.
182 Id. at 391.
183 Id. at 388-91.
184 Id. at 424 (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Blackmun,J., dissent-
ing) (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 9950-51 (1979) and citing John W. Freeman, State
Regulation of Airlines and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 44 J. AIR L. & COM.
747, 766-67 (1979)).
185 Morales, 504 U.S. at 419-27.
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from filling the void. The Justices were divided over what con-
duct impacted aviation economics, and to what extent, if any,
the ADA's preemptive provision covered subjects generally char-
acterized as other than economic issues.
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, the Justices of the Supreme
Court continued to define the scope of Section 1305 as to the
obviously economic matters. 18 6 Yet, again the Court avoided
drawing any borderline between state conduct "relating to" an
airline's rates, routes, and services, and that too remote to relate
to the same.
The Court reiterated that the ADA's preemption provision
barred state imposed regulation of air carriers. But, the Court
made the distinction that the wording of Section 1305 did not
prohibit courts from enforcing airline contract terms set by the
parties themselves.8 7 This conclusion contradicts the dicta in
Morales. 18 8
In Wolens, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer
program challenged the airline's retroactive changes in the
terms and conditions of the program. 189 Applying Morales, the
Court immediately concluded:
We need not dwell on the question whether plaintiffs' com-
plaints state claims 'relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or serv-
ices.' Morales, we are satisfied, does not countenance the Illinois
Supreme Court's separation of matters 'essential' from matters
unessential to airline operations. Plaintiffs' claims relate to
'rates,' i.e., American's charges in the form of mileage credits for
free tickets and upgrades, and to 'services,' i.e., access to flights
and class-of-service upgrades unlimited by retrospectively applied
capacity controls and blackout dates....
As the NAAG guidelines illustrate, the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act serves as a means to guide and police the marketing practices
of the airlines .... In light of the full text of the preemption
clause, and of the ADA's purpose to leave largely to the airlines
themselves, and not at all to States, the selection and design of
marketing mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing of air trans-
portation services, we conclude that §1305 (a) (1) preempts plain-
tiffs' claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.' 90
186 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995).
187 Id. at 820.
188 See Morales, 504 U.S. 374.
189 Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 823.
190 Id. at 823-24 (footnote omitted).
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The Court limited this holding with the following caveat:
We do not read the ADA's preemption clause, however, to shel-
ter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obli-
gations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline's alleged
breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings ....
Market efficiency requires effective means to enforce private
agreements .... That reality is key to sensible construction of the
ADA. 191
The courts, not the DOT, may solve the adjudication of the
private contract disputes.192
The Court even managed to reconcile the retention of the
savings clause with the logic of its conclusions:
The ADA's preemption clause, § 1305(a) (1), read together with
the FAA's saving clause, stops States from imposing their own
substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services, but
not from affording relief to a party who claims and proves that an
airline dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated. This dis-
tinction between what the State dictates and what the airline it-
self undertakes confines courts, in breach of contract actions, to
the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based
on state laws or policies external to the agreement.1
9 3
In an otherwise focused opinion, the Court added a footnote
which addressed issues irrelevant to the case. The Court's pre-
sumed need to do so possibly foreshadows what could be a con-
troversial holding about personal injury claims, as well as a
blanket conclusion which would contradict some of the findings
in Morales. "American does not urge that the ADA preempts
personal injury claims relating to airline operations .... ('It is
unlikely that § 1305(a) (1) preempts safety-related personal
injury claims relating to airline operations.')."194
Justice Stevens' separate opinion revisited arguments dis-
missed by the majority in both Morales and Wolens. He argued
that the ADA's preemption provision did not cover any private
tort or contract claims, and further, that the retention of the
savings clause strengthened the presumption against any pre-
emption. 195 Until Congress accepts its responsibility to either
191 Id. at 824.
192 Id. at 826-27.
193 Id. at 826.
194 Id. at 825 n.7.
195 Id. at 827-28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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reconcile or repeal these contradictory provisions, courts will
undoubtedly continue to use the "savings clause argument" as a
simple expediency to defeat preemption defenses.
Justices O'Connor and Thomas addressed Justice Steven's
opinion. Succinctly, the Justices reminded the Court that
Morales relegated the savings clause to the pre-ADA days and it
remained only as a relic of the past. 196
These two Justices diverged from the majority's opinion only
with the conclusion that Morales's broad preemptive scope dis-
posed of both "respondents' consumer fraud claims, and of
their contract claims." 9 ' These Justices emphasized: "Thus,
where the terms of a private contract relate to airline rates and
services, and those terms can only be enforced through state law,
Morales is indistinguishable."' 98 These Justices noted that Con-
gress revisited Section 1305 after the Court decided Morales and
specifically endorsed the broad preemptive interpretation of the
Supreme Court. Thus, these Justices found any new approach
to preemption unacceptable and emphasized that, if the Court
wished to disagree with Congress and itself, the Court must over-
rule Morales rather than redefine its meaning.'99
To the dissenting Justices, Congress intended the ADA's pre-
emption provision to prevent any source from interfering with
the economic forces in the aviation industry. Justices Thomas
and O'Connor added their own caveat that the ADA sometimes,
but not always, preempted personal injury aviation claims."°
With these perspectives, in Morales and Wolens, the Justices
sharpened arguments which will control the new balance of
power over the economics of the aviation industry within the
federalist system into the twenty-first century.
Actually, whether arriving at a valid conclusion or not, the
Court made an important distinction in Wolens between state im-
posed and privately accepted obligations. Over the years, the
federal and state governments competed for power over the avi-
ation subject. Yet, individual persons play a crucial role, for in-
stance as passengers, in the aviation scenario. In enacting
Section 1305, Congress probably intended to completely pre-
vent the states from interfering with aviation economic matters
196 Id. at 828-34 (O'Connor, J., with whom Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part
I-B, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
197 Id. at 830.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 832.
200 Id. at 830.
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upon the removal from that arena of their major opponent, the
federal government.20 1
Indeed, one can surmise that Congress approved the ADA
and its preemption provision for the purpose of creating free
enterprise business relationships between individuals and avia-
tion enterprises. Such relationships demand the making of pri-
vate contracts as a fundamental basis for economic exchanges.
Thus, logically, Congress intended those entities to avail them-
selves of the penalties and remedies inherent to a contractual
relationship.
Wolens appropriately served to remind the usual contestants
that other players exist in the federalist system who are affected
by preemption. Every factor deserves consideration in establish-
ing an aviation policy. To ignore some of the parties affected by
aviation matters would create an unbalanced scheme for the fu-
ture and endanger the aviation subject itself.
The disturbing note in Wolens, however, concerned the
Court's apparent reluctance in finally dealing with the personal
injury issues. The Court did so in an absolutist manner, in direct
contrast to the Court's intentional practice of using compromise
to arrive at its economic decisions. The parties forced the lower
courts to address these issues within the context of facile, gener-
alized claims and defenses instead of after the presentation of
an all-inclusive analysis of the issue with a sensible solution to
the problems.
Should the United States Supreme Court be forced to make a
decision under the usual circumstances, the aviation industry
will undoubtedly continue to suffer as schismatic a future as is
presently indicated by the various lower courts' decisions. In
fact, the Court very recently vacated a decision, Johnson v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., without even writing an opinion.2 °2
The Supreme Court decided another case in the 1990s, Ha-
waiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,2 °3 which only indirectly involved avi-
201 See Calvin Davison and Lorraine B. Halloway, The Two Faces of Section 105-
Airline Shield or Airport Sword, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 93 (1990). "The theory behind
[Section 105] was that free entry into the system by new air carriers and ex-
panded service by existing air carriers would provide better service and lower
fares for passengers than the detailed regulatory and restrictive entry policies that
had governed air transportation for most of its history. To achieve these objec-
tives, it was necessary to prevent state and municipal authorities from filling the
regulatory vacuum created by Congress." Id. at 93.
202 115 S. Ct. 1247 (1995).
203 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994).
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ation matters. The preemption issue arose within the employee
labor context. The Court refused to preempt the Hawaii
Whistleblower Protection Act and labor remedies because of the
narrow administrative regulations within the Railway Labor Act
(RLA) (not connected in any way with any of the aviation
acts) .904
B. WHILE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CONSIDERED
THE ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS OF SECTION 1305, THE LOWER
COURTS MADE THE 1990S THE DECADE OF SECTION 1305's
EFFECT ON PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS
1. Preemption Cases Based on Other than Section 1305
In the decade of explosive litigation over the ADA's preemp-
tion provision, claimants presented courts with only a few other
aviation issues. Whether everyone conceded precedent ruled all
other matters, or momentarily forgot all else in the obsession
over Section 1305, remains unknown. However, the results of
those few cases should be mentioned.
The various courts followed well-established precedents in
every instance in deciding these other cases. The various groups
originally challenged the logic and extent of the preemptive
scope over these aviation subjects. Having accepted both the
courts' rules and exceptions, neither side sought to raise any
new issues in these cases, but rather characterized the facts to fit
within an existing rule or exception for the courts'
determination.
The courts continued to allow broad preemptive power to the
federal government over the control of aircraft noise.
Both conditions were designed to reduce the effect of aircraft
engine noise on residential properties near the airport. Both are
invalid. They trespass upon a field that has been impliedly pre-
empted by federal law....
That Court's decision in City of Burbank is the 'preeminent au-
thority on the question of federal preemption in the area of avia-
tion.' Furthermore, City of Burbank speaks directly to the
problem of local efforts to control aircraft engine noise. It is
upon that problem that the cited cases focus....o 5
204 Id. at 2251.
205 Harrison v. Schwartz, 572 A.2d 528, 528-29, 531 (Md. 1990) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Blue Sky Entertainment, Inc. v. Town of Gardiner, 711 F. Supp.
678, 691 (N.D.N.Y. 1989)). See also Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v.
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One court upheld the municipal proprietor's rights to control
noise within its limits as excepted in City of Burbank.2 °6 Other
courts noted that neither City of Burbank nor the FAA regula-
tions which provided exclusive federal sovereignty over airspace
covered or preempted state or local zoning or land use laws.2" 7
The airspace and aircraft flying through it remained under
the exclusive control of the federal government.2 8 In fact, one
court took this doctrine to extreme: "Federal regulation of air-
space management, air navigation facilities and air safety is per-
vasive.... Taken alone, the comprehensive federal regulation of
air navigation facilities and air safety would permit the Court to
conclude that local regulation of the construction of air naviga-
tion facilities is preempted."20 9
Before the "preemption explosion," the courts traditionally al-
lowed the same exclusive control over parachuting activities,
and most continued to do so.2 10 However, one court made the
startling statement that the municipal proprietorship exception
from City of Burbank allowed that entity to control flight and
parachutists. 21 1 No other court has followed this line of reason-
ing, nor are any likely to challenge the well-established exclusiv-
ity of control of airspace by the federal government.
The FAA recordation regulation clearly preempts any other
recording law, and state law determines priority status thereaf-
ter.212 States may also continue to tax aircraft property on the
ground so long as that tax in no way constitutes a direct head
tax.213 "For the fee to be prohibited, it must bear some rational
relation to persons or the carriage of persons traveling in air
commerce."214
City of Los Angeles, 979 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992); Minnesota Pub. Lobby v.
Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 520 N.W.2d 388 (Minn. 1994).
206 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1991).
207 City of Cleveland v. City of Brook Park, 893 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ohio 1995);
Guillot v. Brooks, 651 So. 2d 345, 348 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
208 Fiese v. Sitorius, 526 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1995); Banner Advertising, Inc. v.
City of Boulder, 868 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1994); Guillot, 651 So. 2d at 348.
209 United States v. City of Berkeley, 735 F. Supp. 937, 940 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
210 See Skydiving Ctr. of Greater Wash., D.C., Inc. v. St. Mary's County Airport
Comm'n, 823 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Md. 1993).
211 Malone Parachute Club, Inc. v. Town of Malone, 610 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
212 General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Advance Petroleum, Inc., 660 So. 2d 1139
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
213 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Food & Agric., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
214 Id. at 430.
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Just as consistently, courts refused to allow the pervasiveness
of FAA regulations to constitute implied preemption of negli-
gence claims such as design defects?15
Finally, the courts continued to uphold the intent of the War-
saw Convention to broadly preempt any law touching subject
matters within its coverage and specifically limiting liability for
claims within its purview. 216 The simplicity of decisions concern-
ing issues covered by the terms of the Warsaw Convention begs
attention:
The conference at Warsaw had two goals. First, to establish uni-
formity as to documentation such as tickets and waybills, and pro-
cedures for dealing with claims arising out of international
transportation. The second goal .. .of the conference was to
limit the potential liability of air carriers in the event of accidents
and lost or damaged cargo.
The Convention was not intended to afford complete coverage
for casualty losses; it was meant to provide 'necessary protection
of a financially weak industry and [to ensure] that catastrophical
risks would not be borne by the air carriers alone.' 21 7
Another court stated: "[W]e are persuaded that the purposes
for which the Convention was created are not consistent with an
award of punitive damages." '
Two courts addressed issues of first impression but reached
appropriately predictable and logical conclusions. In Koohi v.
United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that
sovereign immunity and the combatant activities exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) preempted the plaintiffs'
215 See Commander Properties Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., No. 88-2202-0,
1994 WL 544126 (D. Kan. Sept. 23, 1994); Sunbird Air Servs., Inc. v. Beech Air-
craft Corp., 789 F. Supp. 360 (D. Kan. 1992).
216 See, e.g., In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir. 1991); Cheng v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 93-C149, 1995 WL 42157
(N.D. Ill. 1995); Levy v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 90 CIV. 7005 (LJF), 1993 WL
205857, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 22 F.3d 1092 (2d Cir. 1994) (the Warsaw
Convention did not preempt state law causes of action not covered by its terms,
but did preempt those covered); Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 820 F. Supp.
1218, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (Warsaw Convention preempted state law causes of
action and not just remedies); Onyeanusi v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
767 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992); Iyegha v.
United Airlines, Inc., 659 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1995);Jones v. American Airlines, Inc.,
No. 93-0131843, 1995 WL 12512 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995); Hibbard v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 592 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
217 Onyeanusi, 767 F. Supp. at 656 (quoting Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872
F.2d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) (citations omitted)).
218 Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1270.
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claims for personal and other injuries suffered as a result of the
downing of an Iranian civilian airline by a United States military
aircraft during a state of military readiness.2 19 In Preston v.
Frantz, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that gen-
eral federal maritime law preempted the plaintiffs' claims for
injuries suffered during a helicopter crash in international wa-
ters. 220 The comprehensive uniformity of the federal maritime
law also begs examination in the aviation context.
2. Section 1305 Preemption Cases Prior to Morales
As noted, only a few cases decided in the 1980s resolved legal
controversies concerning the interpretation of ADA provisions,
and those dealt mostly with economic matters. Only after the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals commented in O'Carroll that Sec-
tion 1305 preempted all state law claims, including those alleg-
ing personal injury, did the courts witness an explosion of
aviation litigation which centered almost entirely on the pre-
emptive breadth of Section 1305. Prior to Morales, courts, even
those in the same state, split over the preemption of personal
injury claims and the precedent for each decision.
Based on O'Carroll, one court held it inappropriate to address
any state law claims pertinent to aviation.2 21 Another asserted
that a private party possessed no private right of action for any
matter covered by Section 1305.222 Citing O'Carroll as control-
ling law, another Texas court preempted a passenger's claim for
injuries allegedly received from the flight attendant's negli-
gence. "Section 1305 clearly applies to Baugh's state law negli-
gence claim. Since Baugh alleges her injury occurred during a
flight and was caused by a flight attendant in the course of em-
ployment, the negligence action arises out of the services af-
forded passengers by TWA. '22 3
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that
overbookinig and boarding procedures did not constitute serv-
ices within the meaning of Section 1305,224 and refused to pre-
empt claims involving such matters. Services meant specialized
219 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
220 11 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 1993).
221 Von Anhalt v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
222 O'Connell Management Co., Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 744 F. Supp.
368 (D. Mass. 1990).
223 Baugh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 87-2611 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 1989),
affid, 915 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990).
224 West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993).
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conduct like mail and cargo operations rather than those re-
lated to passenger flights. The court found, however, that Sec-
tion 1305 preempted any scheme which punished any aviation
service regulated by a FAA provision.225 Thus, the court pre-
empted West's punitive damages claim.226
To add to the confusion, a state court disagreed with the lat-
ter part of the West decision and found that no FAA provisions
preempted state law causes of action for compensatory or puni-
tive damages.2 2 7 Then, another Texas court, while somehow
reconciling its decision with O'Carroll, found that Section 1305
did not preempt claims based on negligent conduct in aircraft
maintenance and operation.228 The United States District Court
for Hawaii basically agreed and held that Section 1305 did not
preempt claims for injuries due to design defects.229
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals obviously
thought that Section 1305 did not apply to airline passenger
services. However, that same court granted stunningly broad
scope to the same provision to balance a federal and state eco-
nomic regulatory matter. In Federal Express Corp. v. California
Public Utilities Commission, the state court found that a California
state agency regulated Federal Express trucks as it did other
common carriers on California highways.2 0 Federal Express ob-
jected on the ground that Section 1305 preempted all such reg-
ulations on its trucking enterprise because the trucking
operation constituted an integral part of its all-cargo aviation
service covered by the FAA and ADA.2 3'
The court found that "Federal Express is exactly the kind of
an expedited all-cargo service that Congress specified and the
kind of integrated transportation system that was federally de-
sired .... Congress has freed it from the constrictive grasp of
economic regulation by the states. '231 2 The court preempted all
state regulatory controls over the trucks.233 Insofar as the courts
characterized the issues as economic matters, in the early 1990s,
225 Id. at 151-52.
226 Id.
227 In reAir Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248).
228 Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
229 Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Haw.
1990).
230 936 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1991).
231 Id. at 1076-78.




based on Section 1305, the courts preempted related state or
local legal actions.
During this time another Texas court decided a Section 1305
aviation issue characterized as an economic matter. In Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox,234 various attorneys general
threatened lawsuits against the airlines for alleged violations of
the states' Deceptive Trade Practices acts. The court held such
laws preempted by Section 1305 and therefore granted the re-
quested injunction.3 5
Most cases in the 1990s involved the impact of Section 1305
on personal injury claims. Yet, the United States Supreme Court
chose Mattox, an "economic services" case, as one of its first
means of attempting to resolve the divisive Section 1305 issues.
The Court's case became the seminal Morales decision.
3. Section 1305 Cases Decided after Morales and Prior to Wolens
Morales seemed a well-reasoned, clearly written opinion which
created some well-drawn lines and rules to enclose, limit, and
define the preemptive scope of Section 1305 on most issues.
The cases decided by the various courts immediately thereafter
proved that assumption wrong. Moreover, the lower courts' de-
cisions served to finally illustrate the divisiveness, possessiveness,
and fierceness of the underlying controversy about which
sphere(s) of power would control tortious conduct in the avia-
tion arena.
Even prior to Morales, the states and federal government indi-
cated a willingness to return economic control to the aviation
industry. But no state, except Texas (momentarily), intended to
relinquish its police powers, nor any individual entity, its tor-
tious rights, to the aviation industry. The aftermath of Morales
only served as a warning to Congress and the United States
Supreme Court that these entities will not succeed in sending a
subtle message. Congress or the Court must confront the per-
sonal injury controversy head-on. Certainly, there is no shortage
of cases from which to choose when the Court decides to ad-
dress the issue. However, it would be better for the industry if
we placed cases other than those presently pending at its
disposal.
Since a great number of courts reached opposite conclusions
based on exactly the same facts or issues, difficulty persists in
2s4 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990).
235 Id. at 787-88.
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characterizing, rationalizing, and predicting the outcome of any
pending case. Certainly, these cases failed to shape any fully ac-
cepted precedent about the scope of the ADA's preemption pro-
vision, and only added confusion to the Morales holding and
general preemption doctrine.
The various courts claimed to reach decisions based on dis-
tinctions between direct or remote services, services as opposed
to safety measures, and economic matters as opposed to tortious
conduct. Most threw in the "savings clause" argument if deny-
ing preemption. It remains easier to list the results than to logi-
cally reconcile them. During these years, various courts reached
decisions about Section 1305 on the following matters:
a. Airline Security Measures
The following cases were preempted: Lawal v. British Airways,
PLC2 36 and Williams v. Express Airlines, Inc.23 7
The following cases were not preempted: Fenn v. American Air-
lines, Inc.;.3 Bayne v. Adventure Tours USA, Inc.;2 39 Curley v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. ;24 Sedigh v. Delta Airlines, Inc.;'4 1 and Khan v.
American Airlines.242
236 812 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (man detained from boarding; conduct
related to services, and based on O'Carroll, preempted by § 1305).
2.17 825 F. Supp. 831 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (handicapped person claimed re-
straint constituted false imprisonment, and on remand after Morales, the court
declined to follow Margolis, deciding that plaintiff's movement during flight con-
stituted airline service and preempted).
238 839 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (passenger sued for false imprisonment
and slander after being detained on possibility of theft, but security measures
related to safety not service or service too remote to be preempted by § 1305).
239 841 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (security measures were services too re-
mote to be preempted by § 1305 where passenger detained while boarding, and
sued for false imprisonment).
240 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (security measures were services too re-
mote to be preempted by § 1305 in alleged false imprisonment upon deplaning
after being falsely accused of smoking marijuana on aircraft during flight).
241 850 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (passenger restrained on aircraft by sky
marshalls as risk and sued for false imprisonment, but since airlines are not likely
to compete over security measures, such claims do not affect economics).
242 639 N.E.2d 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (court agreed with Miller, Margolis, and
Doricent, but declined to follow Lawal, and found security measures were services
too remote to be preempted by § 1305 where passenger alleged false imprison-
ment when detained by security agents over stolen ticket).
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b. Injury Due to Article Impact from Overhead Bin
The following case was preempted: Hodges v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.
243
The following cases were not preempted: Heller v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc. ;244 Kiefer v. Continental Airlines.245
c. Boarding Aircraft
The following cases were preempted: Hirsch v. American Air-
lines246 ; Pearson v. Lake Forest Country Day School,247 and Travel All
Over the World v. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.248
The following case was not preempted: Miller v. Northwest
Airlines.49
d. Refunding Tickets
The following cases were preempted: Vail v. Pan Am Corp.;250
Statland v. American Airlines, Inc.;251 and Johnson v. American Air-
lines, Inc. 252
243 4 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (required by Baugh to preempt state tort claims,
and disagreed with result).
244 No. 92 Civ. 1937 (RPP), 1993 WL 330093 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1993) (Morales
did not require preemption of negligence claim arising from luggage falling
from overhead bin onto passenger's head).
245 882 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994), aff'd, 920 S.W.2d
274 (Tex. 1996).
246 608 N.Y.S.2d 606 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1993) (boarding and seating on flights are
passenger services). In Hirsch, a passenger's claims arose from alleged injuries
received when an attendant dropped a bag from an overhead bin on the passen-
ger. Because no legislative history supported the view that the ADA meant to
preempt personal injury claims, and this was not a borderline case, "[p]ersonal
injury suits, traditionally within the separate sphere of governmental authority
reserved to the states under our federalist system, likewise lie well on the other
side of that border." Id.
247 633 N.E.2d 1315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (boarding and seating policies were
services central to the operation of planes).
248 No. 91-C-3306, 1994 WL 673025 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 1994) (like Pearson, re-
lated to boarding and seating as service and preempted).
249 602 A.2d 785 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (security measures for board-
ing and carry-on luggage are too remote to be preempted service).
250 616 A.2d 523 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (section 1305 preempted all
claims concerning refunds on tickets; Morales casts doubt on Miller and West).
251 998 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012 (1993) (section
1305 preempted any claims about cancelled ticket refunds; complaints should be
directed to DOT).
252 633 N.E.2d 978 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1247 (1995) (section
1305 preempted refunding policy; more compelling than facts in Morales).
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e. Crashes and Landing/Take-Off of Aircraft
The following case was preempted: Lesser v. Mark Travel
Corp.253
The following cases were not preempted: Burke v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc. ;254 O'Hern v. Delta Airlines, Inc. ;255 and Harrell v.
Champlain Enterprises, Inc.256
f. Design Defects
The following cases were not preempted: Cleveland v. Piper
Aircraft Corp. ;257 and Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc. 258
g. Overbooking Flights
The following case was not preempted: West v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. 259
h. Confirmation Mishaps
The following case was preempted: EI-Menshawy v. Egypt
Air. 2
60
The following case was not preempted: Lathigra v. British Air-
ways PLC.261
25" 23 Av. Cas. 18,419 (CCH) (S.D. Tex. 1992) (because landing is essential
operation and service to passengers, claim related to landing procedure is pre-
empted where plaintiff was injured during landing accident).
254 819 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (crash injuries not directly related to
services of airline; crash involved airlines' operations, but service too remote for
claims to be preempted).
255 838 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Passenger injured on rapid descent. De-
scent represented safety rather than service issue. Congress did not intend
§ 1305 to preempt safety issues, or if it constituted service, it was too remote.).
256 613 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (Person killed in airline crash.
Service not coextensive with safety. Crash related to safety and as indicated by
Savings Clause Congress intended courts to adjudicate such claims by traditional
state law methods.).
257 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993) (Tort liability for design defects established
by 1950s. Section 1305 preempted only rates and routes and not meant to pre-
empt tort actions.).
258 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993) (because design defect claims lay outside
§ 1305's reach for rates, routes, or services, such was not preempted).
259 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993) (on remand the court reaffirmed that state
tort and contract claims for overbooking flight are too tenuous to be service cov-
ered by § 1305).
260 647 A.2d 491 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (failure to honor confirmed
reservation related to airline service and thus preempted).
261 41 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994) (failure to honor confirmed reservation service
too remote to preempt under § 1305).
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i. Disembarkation Injury
The following cases were not preempted: Kay v. USAir, Inc.26 2
and Jamerson v. Atlantic Southeast Airlines.263
j. Accidents in Terminal or Ground Transport
The following cases were not preempted: Butcher v. City of
Houston 2 64; Chouest v. American Airlines, Inc. ;265 Stagl v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc.;266 and Knopp v. American Airlines, Inc.2 67
k. Discount Flying Plans
The following case was preempted: Continental Airlines, Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc.268
The following cases went both ways: Wolens v. American Air-
lines. Inc.;269 and Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc.
270
1. ERISA Plans and Physical Requirements
The following cases were preempted: Belgard v. United Air-
lines;27' and Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue.272
262 No. 93-4856, 1994 WL 406548 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1994) (Congress could not
have intended § 1305 to preempt all service-related negligence).
263 860 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (section 1305 did not preempt state law
negligence claims against airlines).
2-64 813 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (services in § 1305 did not encompass
care of building or terminal space).
265 839 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. La. 1993) (accident in ground transportation too
remote to be preempted under § 1305; distinguished from Federal Express as indi-
vidual tort case instead of state economic regulation).
266 849 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (where plaintiff injured by third party, it
is illogical to assume duty to care for building or terminal space, so airline had no
duty to the plaintiff).
267 No. 01-A-01-9406-CV00301, 1994 WL 687004 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1994)
(section 1305 does not preempt standards of care for transportation of passen-
gers in air terminal).
268 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (value pricing plans constituted object of
§ 1305 and limits thereon preempted).
269 589 N.E.2d 533 (Ill. 1992) (damage claim concerned airline's frequent flyer
program and Congress did not intend § 1305 as blanket preemption provision so
injunctive relief was preempted, but breach of contract and consumer fraud
claims survived).
270 626 N.E.2d 205 (Ill. 1993) (on remand after Morales reached same decision
because claims too remote to rates, routes, or services to be preempted; Supreme
Court decision discussed supra).
271 857 P.2d 467 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (few factors are more important to serv-
ices than quality of airline employees, therefore airline's employee requirement
regulations preempted Colorado's Handicapped Discrimination Law).
19961 375
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m. Assault and Battery, and Criminal or Rude Treatment
The following case was preempted: Cannava v. USAir, Inc..273
The following cases were not preempted: Doricent v. American
Airlines, Inc.;274 Sardinas v. American Airlines, Inc.;275 Pittman v.
Grayson;276 and Anderson v. Evergreen International Airlines, InC.
2 7 7
n. Wrongful Death Claims




The following case was preempted: Corporate Travel Consul-
tants, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 2 79
p. Safety Instead of Service
The following case was not preempted: Dudley v. Business Ex-
press, Inc.280
272 12 F.3d 1498 (9th Cir. 1993) (FAA-constituted "medical benefit" in ERISA
plan preempting other regulations).
273 No. 91-30003-F, 1993 WL 565341 (D. Mass. Jan. 7, 1993) (claimed USAir
treated passenger discourteously while ticketing and nonflight and flight services
were too remote to be services under § 1305).
274 No. 91-12084Y, 1993 WL 437670 (D. Mass. Oct. 19, 1993) (one discrimina-
tion even in seating too remote to be legitimate component of service and pre-
empt such claim, but case severely criticized congressional drafting of the ADA
that caused case-by-case adjudication of aviation issues).
275 No. 93-0347267-S, 1994 WL 516811 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1994)
(although attendant shoved passenger, such conduct too remote to be service
under § 1305).
276 869 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (ADA not intended to be safe harbor
from civil prosecution for civil analogues of criminal offenses).
277 886 P.2d 1068 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (services did not encompass safety issue,
point of wrongful discharge claim for which FAA provided no remedy and there-
fore did not intend to preempt).
278 793 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (wrongful death action preempted be-
cause related to service to ill passenger; absence of private remedy not a factor on
the appropriate decision).
279 799 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (Antitrust Act related to rates and was pre-
empted in this case where defendant failed to prove case acceptable for removal
action).
280 882 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.H. 1994) (passenger suffered head injuries, but
measures for safety were not services within the meaning of § 1305).
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
q. All Personal Injury Claims
The following case was preempted: Smith v. American West Air-
lines, Inc.281
The following case was not preempted: Margolis v. United Air-
lines, Inc.282
During this era, one court got frustrated with the confusion
and obsession over the ADA's preemption provision.28 3 The
court thus fashioned its own test for deciding preemption under
Section 1305. The case involved a familiar controversy wherein
the plaintiffs characterized an airline employee's rude conduct
as personally injurious to themselves, while the airline character-
ized the conduct as appropriate service. The court found that
Morales dictated that Section 1305 could preempt some personal
injury claims. Other claims, however, were not preempted by
the court due to congressional retention of the "savings
clause. 284
The court thought that confining an inquiry to the relation-
ship between conduct and airline services inadequately limited
its viable options to resolve such controversies. The court
opined that the overall conduct of flight activity should bear on
a case's outcome. With this in mind, a specific test applied to
each case would decide the preemption issue as a matter of
law.28
5
The test consisted of three steps:
1) Make a threshold determination about whether an activity
constituted a service; and
2) If the activity constituted a service then decide whether the
activity remotely affected airline service; and
3a) If the activity was not remote, then determine if "the un-
derlying tortious conduct" constituted activity "reasonably neces-
sary to the provision of the service [s] ;,,286 and
3b) If not, the state law tort claim retained validity.
281 4 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (until court
overturned precedential law, state law tort claims for personal injury were pre-
empted by § 1305).
282 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding no legislative history intended
ADA to preclude common law negligence actions, provided no remedy for such
complete preemption, and negligence claims were not related to airline
services).
283 Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
284 Id. at 216-21.
285 Id. at 221-22.
286 Id. at 222.
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The court decided reasonableness as a matter of law.28 7
This court created a totally new and detailed test to resolve
the preemption issues in this case. To date, no other court has
adopted this test. More importantly, the court's creation of a
new test indicated its own frustration with the use of the original
preemption doctrine's rules to resolve power struggles and dis-
sensions in the aviation sphere. The court expressed the senti-
ments of many courts in its sense of significant losses of judicial
control over all aviation matters during the explosion of per-
sonal injury litigation.
Having attempted, and failed, to provide some direction and
stability to these tort issues with the Morales decision, the United
States Supreme Court should have confronted, balanced, and
resolved the tort law issues in a subsequent decision. Instead,
the Court most recently, in Wolens, addressed more economic
pricing programs. The Court in Wolens may or may not have
clarified the preemption doctrine's application to economic is-
sues. As will be seen below, it certainly only sustained and in-
creased the lower courts' confusion on tort law issues which
consequently continues to plague the entire aviation industry.
In the interest of stability to stabilize the industry, courts need to
seek a formula to guarantee some continuity and predictability
in legal application of doctrines to various and changing factual
scenarios.
4. Section 1305 Cases Decided After Wolens
The United States Supreme Court used well-written argu-
ments in Wolens to sharpen a position on economic matters in
the aviation sphere. Perhaps the Court hoped to steer the lower
courts toward a more universal and balanced "middle" position
on all aviation matters as well.288 If so, the Court failed in this
aim. After Wolens, the courts continued the dissension over Sec-
tion 1305 in much the same fashion as before the decision.
Again, it remains easier to list results for comparisons than to
reconcile the irreconcilable:
287 Id. at 222.
288 See Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817.
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a. Injury Due to Article Impact from Overhead Bin
The following case was preempted: Costa v. American Airlines,
Inc.2 8
9
The following case was not preempted: Hodges v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc.2 90
b. Boarding Aircraft
The following case was preempted: Shupe v. American Airlines,
Inc.2 9
1
The following cases were not preempted: Rowley v. American
Airlines, Inc.;292 Chukwu v. Board of Directors Varig Airline,293 and
Chukwu v. Board of Directors British Airways294
c. Ticketing and Security Measures
The following case was not preempted: Smith v. America West
Airlines, Inc. 2 9 5
d. Disembarkation Injury
The following case was not preempted: Moore v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc.2 96
289 892 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (based on previous California decisions,
§ 1305 injuries suffered from article falling from overhead bin preempted under
§ 1305).
290 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (The court found that services include ticket-
ing, boarding, food handling, baggage handling, and flying aircraft. Id. In this
case, a passenger's claims were not preempted where bottles fell from overhead
compartment and injured the passenger, since the claim involved operation of
aircraft and not services. Id. This decision reversed the lower court. See supra
note 281 and infra note 295).
29 893 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995), aff'd, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.
1996) (claims for poor boarding services made under state's fraud law preempted
under § 1305; services not excepted by Wolens).
292 875 F. Supp. 708 (D. Or. 1995) (boarding disabled person had no signifi-
cant impact on airline services, and too tenuous for services to be preempted
under § 1305).
293 880 F. Supp. 891 (D. Mass. 1995) (breach of contract claim for boarding
mishap).
294 889 F. Supp. 12 (D. Mass. 1995) (remand to ascertain facts necessary to
determine if contract claims enlarged by state laws per Wolens and preempted).
295 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (where passenger allegedly injured because the
airline ticketed a hijacker and allowed him to board, the claim was not pre-
empted because the service involved safety and operation of the aircraft and
therefore too remote for § 1305 service).
296 897 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (based on Hodges, deplaning accidents
not preempted under § 1305).
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e. Discount and Advertised Programs
The following case was preempted: Wagman v. Federal Express
Corp.297
f. Rude Treatment
The following case was preempted: Harris v. American Airlines,
Inc.2
98
g. All Personal Injury Claims
The following case was not preempted: Katonah v. USAir,
Inc.2
99
The complete inability to generalize or predict the outcome
of the above-cited cases, or similar future ones, indicates the
present fragile and uncertain state of legal affairs on aviation
matters. The current state of the law demands serious thought
about the purpose of aviation in America, and in our ever re-
shaped federalist system. The courts must therefore develop a
better framework in which to decide the larger aviation issues
and establish a much clearer overall policy.
VI. HOW COULD THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE HELP
PROPEL THE AVIATION INDUSTRY AND THE
FEDERALIST SYSTEM INTO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
The United States of America represents a federalist system
created from the union of independent states intending to cre-
ate a greater and stronger whole nation capable of protecting all
of the individual entities' parts. The United States Supreme
Court functions as one component in the deliberate balancing
act maintaining this system by determining spheres of power
therein from the nature and purpose of the Constitution. 0
"[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding. ' 3 1 But we have forgotten! The legal community has
297 844 F. Supp. 247 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 47 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1995) (ADA
language clearly preempted state regulation of advertising airline programs
where Federal Express's overnight delivery related to fares).
298 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995) (serving beverages constituted a service under
§ 1305 and preempted claims made in reference even if characterized as racial in
attempt to conceptionalize a Wolens exception).
299 876 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (Federal law did not preempt state law tort
claims. If such were intended, Congress would have done so explicitly.).
300 M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316; Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1.
301 M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
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become obsessed with shaping the entire future of the aviation
subject within the confines of an interpretation of only congres-
sional intent, limited even more with restrictions by one express
preemption provision. Since the 1990s, the legal community
has forgotten to consider the place and purpose of that individ-
ual aviation subject matter in the Nation's future and shunned
the other legal precedents of decades of prior aviation policy.
As noted in several previous sections, the parallels between
aviation and maritime activities should have prompted thought
to construction of a federal aviation law. Alternatively, the inter-
national scope of such a means of travel and commerce should
have forced some thought toward the development of policies
and laws similar to those which shaped the Warsaw Convention.
Although the authors personally favor either of those two con-
cepts as the most appropriate legal frameworks for future avia-
tion policy, it remains unlikely that such revisions of thought will
occur at this late date in American aviation history.
Within America's federalist framework, the United States
Supreme Court originally posited the preemption doctrine as
one means to maintain the supremacy of the Union. Although
dependent on congressional intent for validation by the time
the Court applied the preemption doctrine to aviation issues, all
of the Nation's courts thereafter accepted the doctrine's appli-
cability to establish the exclusivity of federal control over any as-
pect of flight, including landing and take-off procedures. As
part of the necessity to balance powers and concepts (uniformity
versus individuality) to maintain the federalist system, all of the
courts accepted various powers' control over aviation matters
connected to ground affairs.
Congress drafted and approved the ADA with the knowledge
of these precedents. Congress supplemented the preexisting
FAA congressional legislation with the ADA, based on Con-
gress's policies for the aviation subject and judicial precedent
controlling the balance of powers over it. Congress intended
for the ADA legislation to clarify and enlarge American aviation
policy, not diminish and shrink it to one segregated, obsessive
argument. Congress wrote the ADA to loosen its exclusively fed-
eral economic regulatory control over aviation matters and to
protect its formerly exclusive preserves from another entity's
powers. As Morales held, Congress even meant to broaden its
1996]
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protection to the economic aspects of the business which are
related to matters on the ground as well as in the skies.3 °2
One major function of the legal sphere is to determine the
purpose of each individual part's position within the federalist
system to support the growth of the entity and increase the
strength of the system. If preemption represents another doctri-
nal means to accomplish the task, then we should hardly deter-
mine the entire future of the aviation subject upon the limited,
no matter how broadly worded, language of one such express
provision.
We should interpret Section 1305 in the context of preemp-
tion precedents over the entire aviation subject. Logically, Sec-
tion 1305 serves to substantiate the trend to preempt all laws or
measures regulating aircraft in flight and during takeoff and
landing, including the troublesome and expensive complaints
about employee service on board aircraft, and during boarding
and disembarkation. Continuing to balance powers, courts
would not preempt any complaints about incidents bound to
the ground.
Several more cases with issues similar to those highlighted in
Morales and Wolens may need to be decided to determine the
"bright line" which will illuminate those grounded economic
matters which Congress intended to preempt by the addition of
Section 1305 to aviation policy. Such reasoning, and conse-
quent policy, follows and simply adds definiteness to traditional
precedents in aviation matters.
After research, the "flight" concept seems a more appropriate
solution to the raging controversies of the 1990s, and the more
important problems of propelling the American aviation indus-
try into the twenty-first century. This viable solution, however,
must be solidified with legal precedents and credible evidence
to ensure judicial awareness of the reality of aviation technology
and affairs, as well as its rights to as much protection as any
other entity in the system.
Too often facile and short-sighted legal procedures and tac-
tics, particularly with increased litigation in the 1990s, contrib-
ute as much as any other factor to poorly reasoned, confusing,
and conflicting legal decisions. A Supreme Court decision
302 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 374; but see Paul S. Dempsey, The Disintegration of the
U.S. Airline Industry, 20 TRA.sp. L.J. 9 (1991) (disputing the entire premise of
congressional legislation relating to deregulation upon which courts based all of
the judicial decisions after 1978 which effect the airline industry).
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about the applicability of Section 1305 to all personal injury
claims cannot be far in the future. How visionary it will be de-
pends a great deal on the thought with which litigators present
issues within the next several years. To assume that insurance or
business practices will preserve the aviation industry, regardless
of legal protection and direction, overlooks the evidence of
bankrupt business disasters from the litigation of the 1980s.
Hopefully, the legal community would like to see a strong and
visionary aviation industry wing its way into the twenty-first cen-
tury. To ensure such, we must present a case with issues that will
provide the courts a means to forge useful and understandable
precedents creating a balance of powers which will include and
assimilate the aviation subject.

